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The substantive norms of Chinese corporate governance have been studied
extensively inside and outside China. Yet much less attention has been paid to
the Chinese institutional environment that determines whether and how far those
norms will be made meaningful. While complaints about general lack of
enforcement are common, less common are analyses that concretely tie
institutional capacity to specific enforcement problems. This Article aims to fill
that gap. It surveys a number of state and non-state channels for the
enforcement of corporate governance rules and standards in China, from
markets to regulatory bodies, looking at the specific capacities of each. It
concludes by finding that both state and non-state institutions are surprisingly
ineffective in their contributions to corporate governance. In addition, while the
state, for political reasons, prefers to leave enforcement to state regulatory
bodies, its repression of civil society institutions is so severe that even a modest
relaxation could have substantial benefits.
Professor of Law, the George Washington University Law School. B.A., Princeton
University; J.D., Harvard University. I am grateful for the help I received from a number of
people in the course of researching and writing this article. In particular, thanks are due to
Knut Benjamin Pissler, Larry Ribstein, Tang Xin, and Frank Upham for their ideas and
support, Annie Liu, Katie Reece, and Huang Nian for research assistance, and faculty
workshops at UCLA School of Law, Yale University School of Management, New York
University School of Law, Hong Kong University Faculty of Law, and Cornell University
School of Law for development of the ideas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chinese corporate governance presents many puzzles. Controlling
blocks of stock have historically sold at a vast discount, not a premium, to
the stock market price. China gets a perfect score on a widely used
shareholder-rights index,' yet looting seems widespread.2 The securities
regulator fears that cracking down on abuses will stifle, not stimulate,
financial markets. Policymakers view the separation of ownership from
control in large corporations not as a problem to be solved but as a solution
to be embraced. The leading proponent of independent directors as a
defense against abuses by controlling shareholders is none other than
China's main controlling shareholder, the state. And underlying it all is a
legislative system that observers describe using terms such as "chronic
disorder"3 and "chaos.'A
1 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcoN. 1113, 1130 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Yi Zhang, Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in an
Emerging Economy: Insights from China (Peking Univ., Working Paper, Nov. 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-957549; Ming Jian & T. J. Wong, Earnings
Management and Tunneling Through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese
Corporate Groups (H.K. Univ. of Sci. & Tech., Working Paper, June 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=424888.
See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 711
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Something interesting is going on here. The assumptions and
institutions behind corporate governance in China must be quite different
from those in Western economies. Yet the discussion of Chinese corporate
governance-and indeed, a major body of literature on comparative
corporate governance-often focuses on the substantive rules and seems to
assume that the institutional environment within which the rules operate is
pretty much the same everywhere. The differences are hardly
acknowledged, let alone thoroughly analyzed.
Of course, to state that the law cannot be studied in isolation from the
institutions by which it is made and enforced can hardly be considered
controversial. Nobody will get tenure by pointing out that in the United
States, for example, both the norms of securities law and the means of their
enforcement are inseparable from the regulatory capacity of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. American securities law would look very
different without the army of private-sector lawyers and other
intermediaries that it relies on to function.'
Yet even in a country such as the United States, where the institutional
context of legal rules is well understood at least at an intuitive level by
insiders, scholarship can make an important contribution to understanding
how institutions shape the making and enforcement of legal rules.6 The
Chinese institutional context is by contrast far less well understood and
studied, even by insiders; the payoff to examining it, therefore, is even
greater. And it is not enough just to agree in the abstract with the
proposition that institutions matter; the interesting work lies in actually
figuring out which institutions matter, how much, and why (or why not).
While Chinese corporate governance has become an increasingly
popular subject of study both inside and outside of China, studies
emphasizing the role of institutions in making the norms meaningful are
(1994).
4 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 239 (2002)
(chapter six entitled "The Legislative System: Battling Chaos").
s This is not, of course, to say that the system always produces the desired results. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002). It is just to emphasize that the significance of a norm is inseparable
from its institutional context.
6 Different perspectives on this issue can be found in, among many others, NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 931 (2003); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy ofa Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 53 (1986); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781 (2001); and
Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 0-28, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1000086.
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rare. 7 This Article aims to fill that gap-not just by arguing that institutions
matter in the abstract, but by showing how specifically they matter in
China, and what would have to change for the institutions to matter in a
different way. This complexity is of course not unique to China, but is
perhaps at least more apparent there.
This Article also aims to demonstrate, through its case-study approach,
the dangers of a prominent branch of comparative corporate governance
scholarship-the so-called "LLSV" literature' and its offshoots-that is
dedicated to measuring the legal norms of corporate governance and
correlating those measurements to measurements of financial market
development and economic development more generally. This literature
has been criticized on several grounds: that it focuses too much on
substantive law on the books and ignores enforcement issues;9 that when it
does look at enforcement issues, it again looks just at law on the books;' 0
that its understanding of the law-even just on the books-is often simplX
wrong or inconsistent;" and that the correlations it finds are spurious.
While one case study cannot demonstrate conclusively that attempts to
measure and compare legal rules across jurisdictions are doomed to fail, it
can certainly show that truly understanding a given jurisdiction's legal
system probably requires more than the already Herculean efforts for which
the LLSV literature must be given credit.
Part II sets forth this Article's conception of corporate governance and
various ways of modeling regulatory regimes. It argues that any model
must have the capacity to incorporate choices that were not made in order to
An excellent exception is Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational
Sanctions in China's Securities Market (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 318, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-999698.
8 The key articles forming the foundation of this literature are Rafael La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FiN. 1131 (1997) and, perhaps more
importantly, La Porta et al., supra note 1.
9 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 229, 250-51 (2007).
10 See id at 244, 250-51.
" See Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany-On the
Fallacy of LLSV (Univ. of Manchester Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-728403; Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited-
Further Evidence About Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom (Univ.
of Manchester Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-913968; Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or
Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s "Anti-Director Rights Index" Under Consistent Coding 68
(Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Fellows' Discussion Paper
Series, Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/fellowspapers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf.
12 See Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (Univ. of Mich. Law
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understand better the choices that were made. It then discusses some ideal-
typical models that are useful in understanding Chinese institutions.
Part III provides background information on Chinese listed companies
and their investors that is necessary for understanding the sometimes
surprising features of Chinese corporate governance.
Part IV, the heart of this Article, surveys and discusses in detail several
important institutions for the implementation of corporate governance rules.
The analysis focuses on the role that particular institutions are or might be
called on to play, and their capacity for performing as expected. In addition
to covering institutions such as the stock markets, lawyers and accountants,
and the financial press, it looks in detail at the role played by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission and by the courts. Part V ties the
threads of this Article together and offers a conclusion.
The theme that emerges from this analysis of state and civil-society
institutions is that the corporate governance regime in China relies heavily
on the announcement of rules by government authorities and relatively little
on institutions for making those rules meaningful. Lawmakers expect that
regulated parties will read the legal texts and voluntarily obey; if they do
not, their ignorance or moral failings are blamed, not the lack of
enforcement institutions. 13
Still less does the corporate governance regime look to non-
governmental institutions for the making and enforcement of rules and
standards. A major reason for this is simply political: the government does
not yet accept the existence of institutions that are both powerful and
independent of the state. Moreover, the official cultures of both Imperial
China and China under the planned economy have left their common
legacy: it is hard for state officials to accept that civil society might come
up with a set of procedures better than what they could come up with
themselves.
Yet in relying on the state legal and administrative system to make and
enforce norms, the state is playing a weak card. The post-Mao Chinese
legal system, despite a quarter century of change, remains an institution of
only modest importance in the polity. As a result, with state institutions not
working well and civil-society institutions not allowed to work well, many
areas of Chinese corporate governance display an astonishing enforcement
1 It has been argued that Delaware's corporate law jurisprudence-although not its
statutes-also contains this didactic element. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); William T. Allen,
Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware
Corporate Law 14 (Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy, Research Paper No.
06/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1 105591. An important difference is
that Delaware expects corporate managers to be educated through the medium of the
corporate bar, whereas the corporate bar in China is not expected to, and does not, play this
role.
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vacuum.
II. MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE14
This Article deals with corporate governance in China's listed
companies. I use a relatively narrow concept of corporate governance. It is
concerned with issues of finance and agency cost and has a policy
component: the prevention of the exploitation of those who supply the
money by those who control it." This concept centers on the relationship
between stockholders, the board of directors, and senior management, and
in effect asks, "[H]ow can financiers be sure that, once they sink their funds
[into a firm], they get anything but a worthless piece of paper back from the
manager?"'
This limited conception of corporate governance has two main agency
problems: vertical (the exploitation of stockholders as a whole by
management) and horizontal (the exploitation of minority shareholders by
controllin shareholders). In each case, the controller extracts private
benefits,' but can do so in different ways, and the means of mitigating such
exploitation are different. Moreover, mitigating one kind of agency cost
may mean increasing the other. Dispersed shareholding, for example, can
lead to high vertical agency costs because collective-action problems make
it hard for shareholders to monitor management. But one solution-
concentrated shareholdings-may result in higher horizontal agency costs.
In the United States, the main agency cost problem is vertical; in the
rest of the world, however, and especially in transition economies,
horizontal costs dominate. 9 China seems to be no exception to this pattern.
What is exceptional, however, is the identity of the controlling shareholder
14 This section is based on my previous work in Donald C. Clarke, The Role ofNon-legal
Institutions in Chinese Corporate Governance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN EAST ASIA 168 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008).
15 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
16 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 740-41 (1997).
17 See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance 2 (Harvard Law Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 488, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-612362.
1 See id. at 4.
19 See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World (Harvard Inst. of
Economics, Research Paper No. 1840, 1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-103130
("[T]he central agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders .... ); Jackson & Roe,
supra note 6, at 2-3; see generally Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, International
Corporate Governance, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (2003). For a vivid account
of controlling shareholder shenanigans in Russia, see Bernard Black et al., Russian
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that is engaging in the exploitation: in most cases, it either is or is closely
connected to a governmental entity.
Commentators in the field of comparative corporate governance have
proposed various models of regulation in general and corporate governance
and securities regulation in particular. Paredes posits an essentially binary
model in which the choice is between enabling (and possibly even trivial2 )
law-a la Delaware-and a mandatory regime, "in which a fixed set of
typically more restrictive rules would be imposed on companies, reflecting
* ,,21Ia 'one-size-fits-all' approach to regulating corporate governance.
In a series of articles, Pistor and Xu have also proposed a binary
model, but along a different dimension: they present the choice as between
ex ante regulation by administrative agencies and ex post regulation by
22courts. As they show, legal rules necessarily need filling out in many
specific cases, and whether this filling-out power should be allocated to
regulatory agencies or to courts is by no means self-evident. The same
applies to enforcement powers; the capacity of different institutions to
monitor and enforce will vary with the issue in question, and as Neil
Komesar has shown, the question of relative institutional capacity is
critical.23
Moreover, a recent survey by Jackson and Gadinis of real-world
models of securities regulation leads to the surprising finding that extensive
state involvement in rule-making does not necessarily mean extensive state
involvement in rule enforcement.24 John Coffee summarizes the results:
"[E]nforcement intensity seems inversely related to the intrusiveness of the
20 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
21 Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1077
(2004).
22 See Pistor & Xu, supra note 6; see also Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary
Duties in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law
Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 77 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003); Katharina Pistor
& Chenggang Xu, Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from
Financial Market Regulation (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working
Paper No. 222, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-396141; Katharina Pistor &
Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China, 7
AM. L. & ECON. REv. 184 (2005) [hereinafter Governing Stock Markets in Transition
Economies].
23 See generally KOMESAR, supra note 6.
24 See Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1239 (2007). One of the authors separately develops the concept of
enforcement intensity in Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial
Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications (Harvard Law Sch. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/Jackson_52 1.pdf.
138
Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions
30:131 (2010)
government's ex ante involvement in the market. The closer the central
government supervises ex ante, the less it relies on sanctions and penalties
ex post."25
All these ways of modeling a regulatory regime are based on real-
world observation. While this has obvious virtues, one drawback is that it
makes it difficult to see foreclosed possibilities and to understand why they
were foreclosed. In understanding China's institutional choices and where
reform is or is not possible, therefore, we need to keep in mind the options
that were not selected as well as those that were.
First, the rules could be made by either or both of the state or market
participants (via contract). The Pistor-Xu model does not distinguish, for
example, between ex post court enforcement of mandatory state-made rules
and ex post court enforcement of private contractual arrangements.
Second, the state could choose to enforce either or both of its own
rules or the rules made by market participants (through enforcement of
contracts); we must also leave open the possibility that the state could,
through choice or institutional incapacity, not enforce anyone's rules. The
Paredes model, however, assumes that whether mandatory rules or default
rules are chosen, the state has the capacity to enforce them. Enforcement
by the state also involves choosing enforcement institutions and the degree
to which enforcement will be ex ante (for example, by state vetting of
independent director candidates) or ex post (for example, by punishing
directors who approve of conflict-of-interest transactions that damage the
company).
If the state monopolizes rule-making power, it must be sure to get the
rules right. The demands on a regime that leaves rule-making to the market
are lower; participants in the corporate enterprise may contract for the rules
of association that they think are best for themselves. But these contracts
may be quite complex, and not every country will have a court system able
to enforce them. Thus, we cannot know a priori whether a corporate
governance regime should rely on private contracts, laws enforceable by
courts in private litigation, or regulations enforced by government
27administrative agencies. It is an empirical question.
Third, to the extent that corporate governance is left to market
participants and not monopolized by the state, one can posit three ideal-
typical models-the ownership approach, the shareholder rights approach,
and the market monitoring approach-that operate to mitigate agency costs,
understanding that any actual jurisdiction will typically display a mix.
These approaches may still, of course, require the presence of the state as an
25 Coffee, supra note 9, at 257.
26 See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
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enforcer of institutional arrangements; as Black and Kraakman have
acknowledged, even "self-enforcing" corporate governance rules28 will still
be ineffective if enforcement institutions are so weak that corporate insiders
may ignore them with impunity.29
When there is concentrated ownership and it pays the dominant
shareholder to expend resources in monitoring because it will reap all or
most of the benefit, the incentives of ownership itself can be relied on to
mitigate agency costs. This kind of monitoring relies neither on minority
shareholder rights nor on market signals to discipline management; the
owner is already in charge and does not need the help of courts, and it can
receive from its own analysis the signals that would otherwise be
transmitted by the market.
The ownership approach does not, however, come free. It cannot avail
itself of the benefits of widely dispersed ownership, so companies too large
for any single owner to control cannot use this governance method.
Further, to the extent the owner undertakes its own analysis instead of
relying on market signals, it must expend resources instead of free-riding on
the activity of others.
Finally, while concentrated ownership can mitigate one set of agency
costs-vertical, between managers and shareholders as a body-it can
exacerbate another set-horizontal, between dominant shareholders and
minority shareholders. As the former decrease, the latter may increase.
Which effect will dominate the other cannot be known a priori.
The shareholder rights approach attempts to solve the problems of
minority shareholders who cannot avail themselves of ownership rights;
they have neither the rights nor the incentives of owners. If minority
shareholders get help from the legal system at an acceptable cost, however
(including the cost of informing themselves), they can protect their interests
and both correct and deter management misbehavior.
Like the ownership approach, however, this approach has its
characteristic costs. As the power of shareholders to protect their legitimate
rights increases, so does their power to pursue illegitimate claims. A
corporation whose shareholders enjoy a generous panoply of rights is a
paralyzed corporation. Thus, investors rationally forgo certain rights they
might like for themselves because they know that other investors are
similarly constrained. The key is to strike the right balance. Where that
balance should be struck will differ across jurisdictions, because the
availability of substitutes for forgone rights will differ. If there is a good
substitute for minority shareholder rights, then there is little reason to pay
the cost of an extensive complement of rights because the marginal benefit
28 See Bernard Black & Reinier H. Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HAv. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
29 See Black et al., supra note 19.
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thereby purchased will be small.
This consideration leads to a third approach to corporate governance:
the market monitoring approach. A firm operates in a number of markets
that impose constraints on its management. Most obviously, for example,
the stock market, and not management, has the final word on the
appropriate value of a company's stock. When markets are functioning
well, monitoring is much simpler. If stockholders wish to judge whether
the CEO's salary is excessive, for example, they can look at salaries in
comparable companies.
Of course, knowing that a CEO is paid too much is not the same as
being able to do something about it, so the existence of a managerial labor
market is not a complete corporate governance solution. But if the stock
market shares this knowledge, then the stock price is discounted
accordingly, and those who buy after this knowledge is incorporated into
the stock price are not harmed by it. Thus, the small investor can free ride
off the valuation efforts of market professionals, and to the extent that the
stock market effectively disciplines managers (and dominant shareholders if
management does their bidding), the small investor needs no special
protections.
III. CHINA'S LISTED COMPANIES AND THEIR INVESTORS
A. What They Are
This Article is concerned mainly with China's institutions for
corporate governance as they affect the over 1,700 companies listed on one
of the country's two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.3 1
Therefore, we must understand something about the companies themselves,
because they are in many ways unlike companies listed on stock exchanges
in the West or in other developing countries.
In order to be listed, a firm must have the legal form of a joint stock
company ("JSC") under the Company Law. A JSC must, unless established
through the transformation of a traditional state-owned enterprise, have at
least five initial promoters and shareholders. Until the 2005 revisions to the
Company Law, it was required to have registered capital (an initial equity
investment that cannot be withdrawn) of at least ten million yuan (five
million yuan following the revisions).3 2 JSCs must have a board of
30 Except, it must be admitted, in litigation in which corporate value is an issue; here,
judges have the last word and are often reluctant to simply accept market valuations.
31 There were 1,718 companies as of Dec. 1, 2009. See China Securities Regulatory
Commission [CSRC] Home Page, 2009 nian 12 yue tongji shuju [Statistical Data for
December 2009],
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201001/t20100115_175451.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
32 At the exchange rate prevailing during the 12 years the provision was in effect (1993-
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directors and a board of supervisors (jianshi hui). The shareholders'
meeting is made the highest organ of power within the company and has a
stronger position relative to directors than in the United States. The
Company Law nevertheless contemplates a relatively active role for the
board of directors, with an ill-defined supervisory role for the board of
supervisors.
B. Where They Come From
As most listed companies were originally state-owned enterprises in a
different organizational form, 3 some background about the traditional state-
owned enterprise ("TSOE") is necessary.
1. Introduction to the Traditional State-Owned Enterprise
The most important form of economic organization in the history of
the People's Republic of China, the TSOE is not simply another name for a
corporation, such as Air France, that happens to be wholly owned by the
state. Instead, it can be viewed as a division within the loosely organized
firm of China, Inc. As such, it has managers that can move up a hierarchy
into progressively more politically powerful positions-this is the career
track of many of China's current leaders-but has nothing that could be
characterized as stock or transferable equity interests.
TSOEs were not and are not necessarily all owned by the same
administrative body representing the central state. Instead, the term can be
applied to enterprises controlled by one or more units of government at or
above the county level. The power of management and control over output,
as well as responsibility for supplying inputs, could thus rest in any of one
or several bodies with divergent interests and goals. Thus, if we insist on
speaking of "state" ownership or "state" control of enterprises, we must
conceptualize the state as an entity that is capable of pursuing contradictory
and inconsistent policies.
2005), ten million yuan amounted to about $1.28 million. During this period, the minimum
capitalization required for companies of this kind in the OECD countries was far less: about
$42,000 in Germany, and in Delaware, of course, nothing at all.
33 Almost 90% of listed companies at the end of 2000 were originally TSOEs, see On Kit
Tam, Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, 37 J. Bus. ETHICS
303, 305 (2002). A 2003 study concluded that approximately 84% of listed companies were,
viewed solely from the standpoint of equity ownership and not taking account of informal
mechanisms of influence, directly or indirectly under state control. See Guy S. Liu & Pei
Sun, Identifying Ultimate Controlling Shareholders in Chinese Public Corporations: An
Empirical Survey 2 (Royal Inst. of Int'l Affairs, Asia Programme, Working Paper No. 2,
2003). This figure is roughly consistent with the conclusions of other analysts. See CARL E.
WALTER & FRASER J.T. HowIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: THE STOCK MARKETS AND THEIR ROLE
IN CORPORATE REFORM 137 (John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 2003) (citing 2002 Chinese
study).
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2. Early Efforts at Reform of the TSOE and the Corporatization Policy
Although the diagnosis varies, there is little doubt that TSOEs were
viewed by policymakers at the beginning of the era of economic reform as
plagued by sloth, inefficiency, and waste. The TSOE was not motivated by
profit-a sensible approach since profits in a planned economy simply
reflect the difference between the economically meaningless prices of
inputs and outputs. But there was little pressure on managers to economize,
and their income was unconnected to firm performance.
The government attempted a series of reforms designed to improve
TSOE performance,34 including delegating more production decisions down
to the level of the enterprise, reducing the share of output that fell under the
state plan-thus allowing a certain portion to be sold at market prices at the
manager's discretion-and introducing a contracting system in which the
TSOE was given fixed targets, with the benefits of overfulfillment to go to
the managers (and possibly the workers).
These reforms had varying degrees of success, but further reforms
were needed. Ultimately, the policy of corporatization was adopted as the
foundation of further reforms, and the Company Law35 was passed in the
service of those reforms. As a result, it bears their stamp; the need of non-
state actors for a convenient form in which to conduct business occupied a
very low priority in the minds of state policymakers, and corporate
governance has traditionally been concerned more with regulating and
suppressing than with fostering and nurturing.36
An important legacy of this transformation is that the administrative
channels of control present in the TSOE have not disappeared, but often
continue to function in the shadows, supplanting the formal channels
envisaged in the Company Law. The board of directors may be bypassed
entirely in matters such as appointment of the chief executive officer or
other important decisions. Instead, the government agency that controlled
34 For an overview of these reforms, see generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF
THE PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 (1995).
3 China first passed a Company Law in 1993. See Gongsi fa [Company Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1,
1994) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1993 Company Law]. The 1993 Company Law was
substantially amended in 2005. See Gongsi fa [Company Law] (amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
2005 Company Law].
36 Indeed, it would be anomalous if it were otherwise. There is a deep-rooted official
suspicion of accumulations of wealth not controlled by the state or its officials, coupled with
the suspicion of any organized activity not firmly under state leadership. A government that
bans unauthorized fishing clubs and associations for the study of antique furniture and paper-
cutting, see MINZHENG BU GONGGAO [BULLETIN OF THE MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], No. 41,
June 6, 2003 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter PROSCRIPTION NOTICE], available at
http://tinyurl.com/6dp7pu, is unlikely to welcome the unbridled blossoming of organizations
whose purpose is to make real money.
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the firm before its restructuring will issue instructions in much the same
way after restructuring.37
Current policy on TSOEs is essentially to abolish the form by
converting them into some form of company governed by the Company
Law: (a) a joint stock company (JSC) (gufen youxian gongsi), the
approximate equivalent of the large stock corporation in Western countries;
(b) a limited liability company (LLC) (youxian zeren gongsi), intended for a
much smaller and more closely knit group of investors; or (c) a wholly
state-owned limited liability company (WSOLLC), a special type of LLC
that may be wholly owned by a state agency. This process, which does not
necessarily involve privatization-it all depends on who owns the shares in
the converted company-is already well under way.
The theory driving the corporatization policy is the idea that state
assets can be better managed through the use of a different organizational
form. Another important consideration in adopting the corporate form,
however, was that it made raising money in equity markets possible, and
indeed it is this opening of ownership interests to the public that has made
corporate governance more than simply a way of thinking about internal
state asset management procedures.
A final point to note about the corporatization policy is to clarify what
it is not: privatization or state withdrawal from the economy. The state
remains firmly committed to retaining control over enterprises in several
sectors: national security-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors
providing important goods and services to the public, and important
enterprises in pillar industries and the high-technology sector.
Indeed, part of enterprise reform involves a magnification of the scope
of direct state control through leverage. In the traditional economic
system, the state (through one or more of its agencies) was the sole owner
of a TSOE and exercised full control over it. Corporatization, through the
institution of divisible equity shares, allows non-state investors to
contribute to the enterprise without, while they remain in a minority,
sharing in control. The state maintains the same level of control it had
before, but now over a larger pool of assets.
39
3 This can happen because the directors understand that that is the way things are done
in the company in question. If their signature is later needed on some ratifying document, it
would be quixotic to refuse to provide it.
38 See Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Guanyu guoyou qiye gaige he
fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Decision on Several Important Questions in the
Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises], passed Sept. 22, 1999; Jiang
Qiangui, Gongsi zhili yu guoyou qiye gaige [Corporate Governance and State-Ovned
Enterprise Reform], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIEs NEws], June 12, 2001
(remarks of vice chairman of the State Economic and Trade Commission); Ngok Ma et al.,
Advance and Retreat: The New Two-Pronged Strategy of Enterprise Reform in China, 48
PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 52 (2001).
3 As a former senior policymaker recently boasted, with an equity stake of a mere 6%,
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C. Capital Structure
Under both the original and the revised Company Law, JSCs may have
only one class of shares: common.40 It is crucial to understand, however,
that there are nevertheless several different types of common shares,
distinguished by rules about their ownership and trading.4 1
One important distinction is that between circulating shares and non-
circulating shares. Circulating shares are shares that may be traded freely
and publicly on various stock markets. Non-circulating shares are, like
circulating shares, common stock, but they are subject to severe trading
restrictions. In particular, they are not tradable on the markets. The
category of non-circulating shares was created when TSOEs began
restructuring into JSCs and offering their stock to the public. It was
considered necessary at the time to have an institutional guarantee of
continued state domination of such companies in order to avoid the
suspicion of creeping privatization. Therefore, the shares retained by the
state in an IPO, as well as the shares owned by the state in JSCs that had not
had an IPO, were generally designated "state shares" (guojia gu) and could
be owned only by state organs.
Typically, restructuring TSOEs were required to have about one-third
of their shares as state shares. Another third would go to the public. The
rest was a second category of non-circulating shares called "legal person
shares" (faren gu). These may be owned only by organizations with formal
legal personality, such as companies. They would typically go to SOEs 4 2
that contributed capital to the restructuring company before the IPO-for
example, holding companies, non-bank financial institutions, and SOEs
with a non-state equity holder. These shares can also be held by
government bureaus, leading to some confusion in the distinction between
state and legal person shares. Although these shares cannot be traded on
the market, they can be traded between leal persons with the agreement of
the exchange where the company is listed.
The existence of a large block of non-circulating shares came under
increasing criticism over the years both within China and abroad for its
the state controls the 94% of "social capital" in the Guangzhou Light Industrial Group, and
the enterprise is classified as "state-controlled." See Zhang Jing & Xu Shengru, 196 Jia
zhongyang qiye da zhenghe: yanchu kaishi le [Big Reorganization of 196 Central
Enterprises: The Performance Has Begun], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECON.
REP.], July 14, 2003 (P.R.C.).
40 See 1993 Company Law, supra note 35, art. 135 (stating that additional classes of
shares may be provided for through State Council rules); 2005 Company Law, supra note
35, art. 132 (same).
4 1 For a fuller account of share types, see WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, at 71-87.
42 I use the term "SOE" to denote state-owned enterprises regardless of their
organizational form.
43 See STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA'S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS
AND PROSPECTS 15 (2003).
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distortionary effects, and after several false starts a scheme was finally
devised in 2005 for bringing them on to the market." By the end of 2006,
the vast majority of listed companies had completed the process of formally
reclassifying non-circulating shares as circulating,45 but a large quantity of
reclassified shares are still subject to lock-ups and may not yet be freely
sold.46 Even reclassified shares that may be sold are in many cases simply
not for sale; the holder is a state entity that intends to stay invested. The
subsequent discussion still uses the terms "circulating shares" and "non-
circulating shares"; although the legal distinction has disappeared and all
shares are now technically "circulating," what was true about non-
circulating shares in the past remains relevant to understanding
characteristics of blocks of shares that do not in fact circulate.
D. Who Owns Them?
Because of the rules regarding initial distribution of shares, until
recently the typical shareholding pattern in listed companies was about 30%
for each of the state, legal persons, and domestic public shareholders
(holders of circulating shares), with 10% going to foreigners and employee
shares.4 ' Although this rough average seems robust over several studies,
one study finds that the standard deviation is large, showing that there are
large variations in the formal ownership mix across firms.
Understanding the ownership composition of circulating shares-in
4 For accounts of the scheme, see Suet Lin Joyce Lee, From Non-Tradable to Tradable
Shares: Split Share Structure Reform of China's Listed Companies, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 57
(2008); Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, Bargaining for Compensation in the
Shadow of Regulatory Giving: The Case of Stock Trading Rights Reform in China, 20
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 298 (2006); Andrea Beltratti & Bernardo Bortolotti, The Nontradable
Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper
No. 131.06, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-944412; Gan Peizhong & Meng
Gang, Lun guquan fenzhi gaige fang'an zhong de toupiao biaojue zhidu-jian tan baohu
liutong gu xiao gudong quanyi de zhidu goujian [On the Voting System in the Plan for
Reform of the Segregated Equity System-Also on the Construction of the System for
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Small Circulating Shareholders] (2005),
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/articledisplay.asp?ArticlelD=30456 (P.R.C.).
45 See Cheng Guo, Yu Liangyuan & Ke Changwen, Understanding the Chinese Stock
Market, J. CORP. AcCT. & FIN., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 13, 19 (1,301 companies, with only 40
companies remaining).
46 As of September 2007, the CSRC's web site showed the market capitalization of
circulating shares to be just one-third the value of total market capitalization (valuing all
shares as circulating shares), indicating that it defines as non-circulating about two-thirds of
the outstanding shares of listed companies.
47 This stylized fact was first established in Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, Ownership
Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, 10 CHINA ECON. REV.
75, 76 (1999). See also Haichi Ren, Ru heyouhua woguo shangsi gongsi zibenjiegou [How
to Improve the Capital Structure of China's Listed Companies], SHANGHAI JINRONG
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. SHANGHAI FIN. U.], No. 2, 2004, at 60 (mentioning the high percentage
of state-owned shares) (P.R.C.).
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particular, the balance between individual and institutional shareholders-is
difficult. But it is critical to understanding how capital markets might affect
corporate governance in China.
The stereotype image of the Chinese stock market-one that I shall
argue below is mistaken-is one dominated by small investors. Until the
recent stock market boom, one read frequently of China having 70 million
individual investors 48-about one in five urban residents between the ages
of 15 and 64. This fanciful number, based on confusion between the
number of stock accounts and the number of investors, was debunked years
ago in both Chinese4 9 and English writings. For example, Walter and
Howie, on the basis of a variety of data, put the number of actual holders of
shares at five to ten million, and estimate the actual number of active traders
in China to be from 500,000 to two million.50 The stock market boom of
2007 brought many more investors into the market," leading to claims of as
many as 150 million investors.52 Such claims are unfounded. In fact, many
investors hold duplicate accounts-one in Shanghai and one in Shenzhen-
and some control many more than two. Remarkably, fully two-thirds of
existing stock accounts hold no stock at all-possibly being held in reserve
for market manipulation.53
Individuals appear to dominate because individual stock accounts
constitute well over 90% of all accounts and hold roughly 90% of
circulating shares by value.54 But these numbers are misleading. Research
suggests that as much as 40% to 50% of the value of circulating shares is
controlled by official and unofficial investment funds, often using (legally
or illegally) individual accounts;55 when one then adds in the value of
48 See, e.g., 7000 wan gunin qunian meihu junping kuisun 2045 yuan [70 Million Stock
Investors Lost 2045 Yuan Per Person on Average Last Year], BEIJING XIANDAI SHANGBAO
[BEIJING MODERN Bus. NEWS], Jan. 5, 2005 (P.R.C.).
49 See Woguo zhen gumin buguo yiqian wan [True Shareholders in China Not More than
Ten Million], TIANJIN RIBAO [TIANJIN DAILY], Dec. 13, 2001, at 3 (P.R.C.).
50 See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, at 148.
51 For example, in the 18 months from mid-2004 to the end of 2006, the number of stock
accounts rose from 71.5 million to 78.5 million. In the next six months, the number shot up
to 107 million. See CSRC Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
On a single day-May 28, 2007-investors opened 385,000 new accounts. See Geoff Dyer,
Share Trading Accounts in China Hit 100M, FT.coM, May 29, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dd04ddfa-Oe3b- 11 dc-8219-000b5dfl062 1.html?nclickcheck=1.
52 See David Barboza, In Shanghai, Countless New Investors Learn a Hard Lesson:
Bubbles Burst, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at C5 (citing sources at JPMorgan); Shu-Ching
Jean Chen, Poor, Greedy and Powering China's Stock Market Boom, FORBES, Jan. 16, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/16/china-investors-survey-markets-
econ cxjc 01 l6marketsl.html (claiming 136 million investors).
53 See Arthur Kroeber, China Stock Frenzy, FT.coM, July 2, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d65e2c92-2847-1ldc-80da-OOOb5dfl0621.html.
54 See GREEN, supra note 43, at 70-75.
5 See id.; Barry Naughton, The Politics of the Chinese Stock Market, CHINA LEADERSHIP
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circulating shares controlled by other institutions, the actual percentage of
shares in the hands of individuals becomes even smaller. In sum, probably
no more than 5% of China's households are individual investors active in
the market, and they probably hold no more than 30% of market
capitalization. By contrast, about 20% of United States households hold
shares directly, to say nothing of those holding shares through mutual
funds, pension funds, and the like.5 6
Both overall and within the non-circulating share block, ownership
concentration is high in Chinese listed companies. This is what one would
expect in a country such as China, with weak institutions for investor
protection,57 but given the overwhelming role played by government policy
over the years in preventing dispersed ownership, there may well be room
for less concentrated ownership even without improvements in investor
protection.
In particular, control by a single state shareholder is quite common in
Chinese listed companies. A study of corporate governance conducted in
2002 by the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
found that of 1051 controlling shareholders in the 1175 listed companies
studied, 77% could be considered state organs (guojia xingzhi), while in
390 companies a single state shareholder held over half of the shares.58
This feature of listed company ownership structure-the concentration
of controlling shareholdings in state agencies and holding companies-
makes China an outlier among a number of countries, 59 and of course raises
questions about the transplantability of corporate governance models from
those countries.
IV. INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 60
What, then, are the institutions of corporate governance, and how do
they interact with particular types of norms? In this Part, I shall discuss a
number of such institutions both generally and in their Chinese context.
To understand the challenges facing any corporate governance regime
MONITOR, No. 3, 2002, at 4, 5, available at
http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm3BN.pdf.
56 See GREEN, supra note 43, at 72-73.
5 See La Porta et al., supra note 26, at 14.
The study is reported in Ping Qi, Guojia jing mao wei fuzhuren Jiang Qiangui: Zuo
shangshi gongsi chengxin fuze de konggu gudong [SETC Vice Chairman Jiang Qiangui: Be
a Sincere and Responsible Listed Company Controlling Shareholder], JINGJI RIBAO [ECON.
DAILY], Jan. 29, 2003 (P.R.C.).
5 See, for example, the table in STOYAN TENEV & CHUNLIN ZHANG, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN
MARKETS 82 (2002).
6o The discussion of non-state institutions in this section (excluding gatekeepers) is based
on my previous work in Clarke, supra note 14.
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in China, it is important to learn about the players, both human and
institutional, who have a stake in policy or the power to influence it. Who
is the intended decision-maker or norm enforcer, and is that person or
institution better suited to the task than any alternative person or institution?
A common complaint among Chinese academics and lawyers, for
example, is that the rules of the Company Law are too general and not
usable. Certainly this is true some of the time-how, for example, should
one interpret the phrase "relatively large in scale" in Article 52 of the old
Company Law? 6  But sometimes the expectations of the critics seem
unrealistic. No piece of legislation can spell everything out; the key is to
have an alternative system available to supplement legislative gaps. Indeed,
often the detailed standards the critics cite with approval come not from the
legislation of other countries but from case law, or have been developed
through case law.
A further complaint is that even when the language of the Company
Law appears clear, regulated parties do not obey the law, or else the forms
provided by the law, such as the board of supervisors, remain decoratively
on the shelf but do not function as the drafters intended. Commentators
tend to blame the actors for not conforming to the law's idealized structure.
But the real fault lies in the law's failure to provide an enforcement
mechanism, particularly one that can be activated by those who are hurt by
non-compliance. Absent an enforcement system, it is pointless from a
policymaking perspective to simply blame the non-compliant, since the
only consequence is a hope for a change of heart and better compliance in
the future.
This Part attempts to enrich our understanding of the institutional
context for corporate governance in China by exploring particular
mechanisms by which the rules and standards might be made meaningful.6 2
It concludes with a detailed examination of both the CSRC and the court
system and assesses their potential for playing an important role.
61 Or the term "relatively small in scale" in the corresponding Article 52 in the new
Company Law. See 2005 Company Law, supra note 35, art. 52.
62 For reasons of space, I have omitted discussion of a few potentially important
institutions because at present there is less to say about them than about others. For
example, the threat of a hostile takeover can play a role in disciplining management and
reducing agency costs, but hostile takeover attempts are extremely rare in China. An active
financial press can also play an important role in corporate governance by providing
information to the investing public and by posing the threat of a public shaming to dishonest
or incompetent managers. And intra-corporate monitoring by independent directors or (in
China) the board of supervisors (jianshi hui) can at least in theory play some role, which I
have discussed extensively in another article. See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent
Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006).
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A. The Role of Stock Markets and External Debt in Corporate Finance and
Corporate Governance
Several institutions exist that align the interests of managers and
shareholders.6 3 If a corporate governance scheme does not rely on legal
sanctions or the good conscience of parties, it can use markets of various
kinds-product markets, capital markets, and labor markets-to pressure
parties to act as desired. These markets impose some degree of discipline
on management, but the discipline is often loose, not tight. It may take time
for selection pressures to act on firms operating sub-optimally. 4
When economic reform began in China in 1979, markets did not
discipline managers because little economic activity of importance took
place in the market. Over time, competition-especially in product
markets-has increased. Nevertheless, a number of companies remain in
protected markets; this gives their management a degree of slack.
Two important markets are those for external debt and equity
financing. To understand the Chinese corporate governance environment,
we must then understand both.
1. Historical Background
In the pre-reform era, it made little sense to talk about equity and debt
financing at all, let alone equity and debt markets. The TSOE of the pre-
reform era received all of its funding from government bureaus of various
kinds. There was no financial market in the sense of firms seeking
financing by offering competitive terms, or suppliers of funds offering
63 See Roe, supra note 17, from the list in which several of the institutions examined here
are taken.
6 It is a standard claim of the law and economics literature that competitive pressures,
where they exist, drive out inefficient structures through a survival-of-the-fittest selection
process. That this may be true in a long-run equilibrium does not, however, make it true
that, at any given moment, no inefficient structures can be observed. It takes time. Miwa
and Ramseyer, for example, while sometimes acknowledging that competitive pressures
"drive firms toward" a firm-specific optimum number of outside directors, elsewhere go
much further and assert in effect that all firms are always already there. See Yoshiro Miwa
& J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints Them, What Do They Do?: Evidence on Outside
Directors from Japan 6 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 374, 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.comlabstract_id=326460
(analogizing a sub-optimal number of outside directors to $20 bills lying on the sidewalk in
order to conclude that all firms in their survey must already have the optimal number). This
vastly overestimates the flexibility of human institutions. See also RATIONAL CHOICE 26
(Jon Elster ed., 1986) (questioning the applicability of the biological analogy to economic
activity on the grounds that the economic environment changes rapidly relative to the speed
with which inefficient firms are eliminated from competition, and that therefore at any given
time we are likely to observe efficient and inefficient firms coexisting); Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481,
503 (1985) ("The operation of alleged selection pressures is ... neither an object of study
nor even a falsifiable proposition but rather an article of faith.").
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financing in the same way. There were banks that performed an
intermediation function by collecting the funds of individual depositors, to
be sure, but they allocated funds to firms according to government
direction, acting essentially as cashiers.
Back then, if the firm received money directly from its government
administrative superior, the transfer would be characterized as a grant; if the
money came from a bank, it would be called a loan. But even if the funds
came with the label of "loan," firms operated under a soft budget
constraint66 and were under no particular pressure to repay. While firms
still competed for money, they did so on a bureaucratic, not a market, basis.
The reform of this system began in the 1980s, when four major state-
owned banks67 were established to handle conventional banking. In the
1990s, so-called "policy banks" 68 were created to handle non-market-based
lending, while the other banks-including newly authorized "joint stock"
banks' owned by local governments together with other institutional and
occasionally private investors-were supposed to make loans based on
commercial criteria. While these other banks may be more profit-oriented
than the Big Four, they are still subject to significant political influence in
their functioning (they are typically owned in part by local governments)
and have not been able to escape the obligation to make "policy loans."'0
Partly for this reason, non-performing loans became a major burden on the
banking sector in the 1990s, and by the late 1990s, the system was
insolvent.7 1
Although stock markets had been in existence since 1990, it was in
1996 that the government, looking for an alternative to bank lending, turned
to them as a way of providing a new source of financing for the troubled
state sector. This marked the beginning of unequivocal state support for
stock markets. It also solidified some key features of the Chinese stock
markets: first, that their primary role has been not to allocate capital to the
65 On the pre-reform era banking system, see generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S
UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 59-127 (1998).
66 The essence of the soft budget constraint is the notion that the difference between
proceeds of production and costs of production is not a matter of life and death for the firm,
and that this difference therefore does not act as an effective constraint on firm behavior.
See JANOS KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE 302-14 (1980); Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget
Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3 (1986).
67 The Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Construction
Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China.
68 The Agricultural Development Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the
Export-Import Bank of China.
69 Such banks include the Bank of Communications, the Shenzhen Development Bank,
China Everbright Bank, and the China Merchants Bank.
70 See GREEN, supra note 43, at 22. During the Asian financial crisis, for example, the
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most efficient enterprises, but to raise money for restructuring SOEs, and
second, that the state has been both regulator and cheerleader, with the
specific mission of keeping stock prices up in order to support the financing
of SOEs.72
2. The Stock Market in Recent Years
a. How Important Is It?
Given the support China's stock markets have received from the state,
much writing on them unsurprisingly assumes that they are critical to the
Chinese economy. At least until recently, this assumption has been
questionable.
China's two stock markets both began operations in late 1990." By
the end of 2005, they had grown to the point of having 1,381 listed
companies with a circulating share capitalization of 1.06 trillion yuan
(approximately $132 billion), or 6% of gross domestic product in that
year. This put China around twentieth in the world in terms of market
capitalization. Looking at market capitalization as a percentage of GDP in
2006, the United States showed 148%, while Hong Kong showed 904%.
Other transition economies such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia
show 34%, 44%, and 107% respectively. 75 In short, the stock market is not
large by most measures, although recent volatility makes it difficult to
measure size with confidence.
Why, then, were there at the same time widespread claims that China's
market capitalization was about $500 billion,76 ranking China ahead of
72 See Chao Gupiao, Panic Attack, CHINA ECON. Q., June 2008, at 16; Le-Yin Zhang, The
Roles of Corporatization and Stock Market Listing in Reforming China's State Industry, 32
WORLD DEv. 2031, 2044 (2004); Sebastian Heilmann, The Chinese Stock Market: Pitfalls of
a Policy-Driven Market, CHINA ANALYSIS, Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.chinapolitik.de/studien/china-analysis/no_15.pdf.
7 Although the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was not formally established until 1991, some
trading took place in the previous year.
74 See generally CSRC Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
7 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, available at
http://go.worldbank.org/XML5QSOCRO (various years). The absolute numbers for market
capitalization, sourced from the World Development Indicators, are available in convenient
comparative form at Nationmaster.com, Market Capitalization of Listed Companies,
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco-mar-capof_1is_com_cur us-capitalization-listed-
companies-current-us (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
76 See, e.g., Chong-En Bai et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 564, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-393440; China to Complete State-Share Reforms This Year, CHINA
DAILY.COM, Apr. 24, 2006 (Agence France-Presse report),
http://www.chinadaily.net/china/2006-04/24/content_575484.htm; United States-China
Economic Relations and China's Role in the Global Economy: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 22 (2003) (written statement of the Securities
Industry Association), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
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Hong Kong and behind only Japan in Asia? The answer is that such claims
unrealistically valued non-circulating shares as if they were circulating
shares. All the available empirical evidence shows that non-circulating
shares-historically as much as two-thirds of capital stock-sell at a large
discount to circulating shares, sometimes by as much as 90%.7 An
economically realistic valuation would therefore be much lower.
In the spring of 2006, the market capitalization of Chinese listed
companies, however measured, began to rise dramatically. From the end of
March 2006 to the end of May 2007, the market capitalization with all
shares valued (unrealistically) equally rose from 3.54 trillion yuan ($468
billion) to 17.8 trillion yuan (US $2.36 trillion). The market capitalization
of circulating shares rose from 1.23 trillion yuan ($164 billion) to 5.94
trillion yuan ($786 billion) in the same period. This certainly makes
Chinese stock markets more important than previously. At the same time,
however, the market surge evident in mid-2007 now stands revealed as a
bubble.79  By some measures, Chinese market capitalization exceeded
Japan's as of late August 2007, a conclusion that seems hard to justify.so
As of the end of June 2008, China's circulating share capitalization was
$868 billion (about 9.7% of GDP), while its total capitalization, valuing
non-circulating shares as if they were circulating shares, was $2.6 trillion
(about 29% of GDP). Circulating share capitalization then fell to $529
billion by November 2008, but by early December 2009 had shot back up to
$2.2 trillion.81
In terms of funds raised for investment, the stock markets are not
important. In 2002, the stock market provided only $8.9 billion of
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108 house hearings&docid=f:92208.pdf.
n See Zhiwu Chen & Xiong Peng, Discounts on Illiquid Stocks: Evidence from China
(Yale Int'l Ctr. for Finance, Working Paper No. 00-56, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=286169 (finding that non-circulating
shares on average have a 70%-80% illiquidity discount when traded on informal markets);
WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, at 186. For more extended discussions of how to value
listed companies, see GREEN, supra note 43, at 6; WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, at 188-
89.
78 See CSRC Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). Another
useful Web site for Chinese stock market data is at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/csm/highlight.asp?LangCode=en.
7 As of July 24, 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange index was at 2910; in mid-October
2007, it peaked at over 6000. See Yahu Caijing Pindao [Yahoo Finance and Economics
Channel], http://finance.cn.yahoo.com/ (P.R.C.); see also Barboza, supra note 52.
8o See Geoff Dyer, Chinese Stock Market Bigger Than Japan's, FT.coM, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/96036374-557e-I dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick check=1.
In the words of Fraser Howie, a long-time observer of the Chinese market quoted in the
story, "All reality has been suspended in China."
81 See Jiawei Zhang, Negotiable Market Value ofA-Shares Back to 10 Trillion Yuan,
CHINA DAILY.COM, July 10, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-
07/10/content_8413535.htm; CSRC Home Page, supra note 78.
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corporate finance, while bank loans provided $217.7 billion.82 But while
bank loans account for the lion's share of external financing, it is important
to realize that external financing as a whole is much less important than one
might think. In 2005, about 40% of fixed asset investment was funded by
enterprise "self-owned" funds (probably retained earnings and possibly
including depreciation and amortization amounts), compared with a mere
0.05% funded by equity issues. On the whole, then, "[b]oth the scale and
relative importance (compared with other channels of financing) of China's
external markets are not significant." 84
b. Characteristics of Investors
Understanding who the investors are and how they behave has critical
implications for corporate governance. First, it helps us understand whether
equity markets can in fact serve a disciplining function. Do they respond to
failures of corporate governance? Second, it helps us to assess the necessity
and urgency of measures to help the small investor who, in the popular
image of the stock market, is getting roughed up by the big boys. If small
investors threw up their hands and left, would it matter?
Current research presents a mixed picture. The picture of the average
investor as a naive retiree staking his retirement savings is false. Only
17% are over 55, and they tend to play the market as a pastime, like bingo.
Institutional investors, not fickle individuals, play the dominant role in
market movements. And the trading strategy they adopt is largely
speculative: the average holding period in China is about one to two
months, compared with 18 months in the United States." In addition,
82 See Stephen Green, Better Than a Casino: Some Good News from the Frontline of
China's Capital Market Reforms 19 (Royal Inst. of Int'l Affairs, Asia Programme Working
Paper No. 6, 2003) (citing sources); see also GREEN, supra note 43, at 29 (table showing
comparative data for 1993 through 2002); Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic
Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. EcoN. 57, 79-82 (2005).
83 See CEIC Data, Premium China Database, http://www.ceicdata.com/china.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2010). Substantial amounts of investment also come from categories of
unclear significance labeled "other," but the insignificance ofthe equity amounts is clear.
84 See Allen et al., supra note 82, at 73.
85 Consider, for example, the case of Si Dansu, a retiree quoted in a recent news article as
saying that she had invested all her savings ten years ago and lost them in the recent
downturn in the stock market. See Barboza, supra note 52. This tale might be true, but
certainly it is implausible on its face, because ten years ago the Shanghai Stock Exchange
index was at about 1500 to 2000, whereas when the article about her was written, the index
was at about 3400.
86 For a full analysis of the investor community, see GREEN, supra note 43, ch. 4 and
WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, ch. 7.
87 On institutional investors, see HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS IN MAINLAND CHINA (2004), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/research/rpapers/IIMC.pdf.
88 See Xu & Wang, supra note 47, at 85. A more recent study finds a turnover velocity
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China's stock markets have a high degree of synchronicity: one study found
that 80% of the stocks listed on the two exchanges moved in the same
direction in a given week.89  This degree of synchronicity is the second
highest among stock markets in 40 countries; it suggests that stock prices
move in response to information about the market in general, not about
specific firms. 90 In other words, Chinese investors rationally worry more
about the latest twists and turns in government policy or other market-level
rumors than about corporate results. At the same time, however, a number
of studies have found that Chinese investors do respond rationally to
corporate-level events.9
Inconsistent as some of the empirical findings are, it is nevertheless
possible to draw a few tentative conclusions from existing research. First,
the picture of the Chinese stock market as solely speculative is probably
overstated. Investors are more concerned with fundamentals and
governance than observers give them credit for. Thus, good governance
will ultimately be rewarded.
Second, while a great deal of speculation does take place on the
market, it is driven by institutional investors, not individuals. Therefore,
current government policy-which blames individuals for speculation and
attempts to curb it by encouraging institutional investors who will, it is
assumed, take a longer-term perspective-is unlikely to be successful.
Third, policymakers in the field of corporate governance should not
worry so much about the small investor.92 He is not a major source of
funds, and in any case can be no more than a price taker. Contrary to
government fears, a market downswing will not bring 70 or 150 million
of 509% in 2000. See Eric C. Chang & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and
Performance in China's Listed Firms, 25 J. COMP. EcoN. 617 (2004); see also Bei Hu,
Exposure to Stocks Unhealthy; Trading Mostly Speculative, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr.
16, 2002, at B4.
89 See Randall Morck et al., The Information Content ofStock Market: Why Do Emerging
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movement?, 58 J. FIN. EcON. 215 (2000). For
further studies confirming the high synchronicity of Chinese stock markets, see Art Dumev
et al., Capital Markets and Capital Allocation: Implications for Economies in Transition, 12
EcoN. OF TRANSITION 593 (2004); and Merritt Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 331 (2003).
90 See Chang & Wong, supra note 88, at 25.
9 See, e.g., Bai et al., supra note 76, at 22 ("[B]etter governed companies in China are
highly regarded in China by investors who are willing to pay a premium for high governance
standard."); Charles J.P. Chen et al., Is Accounting Information Value-Relevant in the
Emerging Chinese Stock Market?, 10 J. INT'L ACCT., AUDITING & TAx'N 1 (2001) (investors
react rationally to accounting numbers).
92 This is the advice for developing and transition economies generally by Erik Berglif &
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications
for Transition and Developing Countries 24-25 (Conference Paper, Annual World Bank
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angry citizens into the street protesting the loss of their life savings. It
would, of course, create massive discontent among a small elite of the
wealthy and powerful, which may be an equally good explanation for
government fear of a falling market. But it is not the same thing.
3. Banks
Capital structure has implications for oversight: when a corporation
has dispersed ownership and low leverage, managers have a great deal of
slack. Conversely, high debt levels lead to close monitoring by creditors.
To the extent that creditors' interests are congruent with those of
shareholders-and they often are-shareholders can free ride on creditor
monitoring.
In many countries, banks play an important role in corporate
governance.9 Unlike small shareholders, banks have both the ability and
the incentive to monitor the financial health of their debtors, and may
impose loan covenants requiring their consent for certain corporate actions.
Indeed, academic research suggests that investment financed with bank debt
tends to be more efficient than investment financed with retained earnings,
probably because the former must be justified to a third party, whereas
management's use of retained earnings is subject to no such oversight.94
Banks may also be sufficiently dubious of a prospective borrower's
financial health to refuse to lend at all, thus hastening the departure of a
poorly run or otherwise inefficient company from the economy. And they
may themselves be major shareholders, as in Germany or Japan (although
not in the United States).95
Chinese banks, however, have historically had neither the capacity nor
the incentive to play this monitoring role. As discussed above, banks'
traditional role was that of cashier for the state. Even after the reforms of
the 1980s, lending decisions were often based on political criteria and the
9 See generally Cheryl Gray, Creditors' Crucial Role in Corporate Governance, FIN. &
DEV., June 1997, at 29. Corporate governance literature typically distinguishes between two
models: one reliant on equity finance and capital markets, and one reliant on debt finance
with banks as major shareholders and creditors. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993);
Masahiko Aoki, Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition
Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 3 (Masahiko Aoki &
Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995); Erik Bergl6f, Corporate Governance in Transition Economies:
The Theory and Its Policy Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL
ECONOMIES 59 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995).
94 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 Am. ECON. REv. 323 (1986); see generally Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, Debt
Financing, Soft Budget Constraints, and Government Ownership: Evidence from China, 15
EcoN. TRANSITION 461, 462-63 (2007) (reviewing relevant literature).
9 See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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perceived needs of SOE borrowers, rather than on the prospect of
repayment.96
Bankers thus did not have the tools to understand whether a loan was
being put to good use or not; they did not concern themselves with this
question, and the accounting system at the time would not have provided an
answer.97 They were simply to supply the money when ordered to do so.
Nor did they need to worry about defaults; profit was simply not the
objective and therefore played no significant role in the evaluation of bank
executives.
Moreover, once profits did become important, it was book profits as
reported to administrative superiors that mattered both to the bankers and to
their superiors; thus, banks were forbidden to write off-i.e., declare a loss
on-more than a portion of their non-performing loans. Attempting to put a
defaulting debtor into bankruptcy would also have had the effect of forcing
the bank to close the books on a bad loan, instead of keeping it on the asset
side by lending the borrower enough money to make interest payments.
The result is that banks have lacked what might be called a culture of
monitoring. 98 This in turn has shaped corporate law, as the state has tried to
do through corporate law what the banks seem incapable of doing for
themselves-protecting their interests as creditors. 99 In other words, far
96 See Dongwei Su, Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China 6 (Jinan
Univ. Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=250802 ("If [a] political
favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright
transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs [state-owned enterprises.]"); see also supra Part
IV.A.
97 The Chinese accounting system in the pre-reform era was typical for a planned
economy. It was about matching sources to uses to monitor the spending of funds as the
funder intended. It was not about matching revenues to expenditures to ensure that
investments were profitable. See generally ALLEN HUANG & RONALD MA, ACCOUNTING IN
CHINA IN TRANSITION: 1949-2000, at 25-28 (2001). And the design of current accounting
rules often owes as much to the need to ensure tax revenues as to the need to match revenues
with expenditures. See Charles J.P. Chen, Ferdinand A. Gui & Xijia Su, A Comparison of
Reported Earnings Under Chinese GAAP vs. IAS: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock
Exchange, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 91, 102 (1999) (citing CHI-WAN YANG & JILIANG YANG,
HANDBOOK OF CHINESE ACCOUNTING (1999)).
98 See Clement Kong Wing Chow & Michael Ka Yiu Fung, Ownership Structure,
Lending Bias, and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Shanghai's Manufacturing Sector,
26 J. COMP. EcoN. 301, 303 (1998); Jenny J. Tian & Chung-Ming Lau, Board Composition,
Leadership Structure and Performance in Chinese Shareholding Companies, 18 ASIA PAC. J.
MGMT. 245, 249 (2001).
99 Of course, every mature legal system provides a range of protection for corporate
creditors; in the United States, such protection is accomplished largely through state law
restrictions on corporate distributions and state and federal rules on fraudulent transfers. In
China, however, corporate law protection is viewed as necessary to save creditors from their
own misguided lending decisions-and such decisions can be very misguided indeed.
Consider, for example, the case of the man who received a bank loan of 3.4 million yuan for
his shell company that had no assets. Had the bank done any due diligence-simply to the
extent of visiting corporate headquarters-it would have discovered that there was an
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from enlisting the help of banks in monitoring corporations, China's
corporate law sees banks as passive victims in need of protection.
Recent scholarship suggests that the monitoring value-added of banks
in Germany and Japan is much less than was supposed during the eighties,
when German and Japanese models of corporate governance were in
vogue.100 If German and Japanese banks find it difficult to monitor
effectively, it is clearly unrealistic to expect Chinese banks to manage well.
And because banks are often still required to lend for political reasons, the
result is that corporate management has been subject to the discipline
neither of the credit market when seeking a loan nor of lender monitoring
after obtaining it.
Although banks do not seem to monitor well, it is still possible that
debt financing could improve corporate governance by reducing free cash
flows subject to management's discretionary control.' Recent research on
this topic points in two directions. First, as in many other studies of
corporate governance, ownership seems to matter. Second, as leverage
increases, listed companies controlled by a government shareholder actually
display increased managerial agency costs (in the form of managerial
perquisites, over-investment, and corporate expenses) whereas companies
controlled by a commercial shareholder show either reduced or unchanged
agency Costs.102 It may be, therefore, that as shareholding in Chinese
companies progressively shifts to non-government bodies, debt financing
can be expected to play more of a role than it does today.
B. Ownership Structure
Large shareholders can often be reasonably effective in monitoring
corporate managers; if they do not abuse their control rights, their efforts
redound to the benefit of small shareholders as well. Many Chinese
commentators, however, bemoan China's concentrated ownership structure
as almost perverse and unnatural, and see widely dispersed shareholding in
the American model as the ideal ownership structure.1 03 Yet the American
overgrown field with a few small buildings at the company's address. See Wu Jianzhong,
Yiqi xubao zhuce ziben, daikuan zhapian an de zhenpo yu bianxi [The Breaking and Analysis
of a Case of False Reporting of Registered Capital and Fraudulent Borrowing], ZHE JIANG
GONGAN GAODENG ZHUANKE XUEXIAO XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF THE ZHE JIANG PUBLIC SECURITY
COLLEGE], Aug. 2001 (No. 4), at 77, 77-79 (P.R.C.).
100 On the softness of German and Japanese bank monitoring, see Shleifer & Vishny,
supra note 16, at 773, and the sources cited in La Porta et al., supra note 26, at 17-18.
101 See sources cited in Tian & Estrin, supra note 94, at 462-63.
102 See Tian & Estrin, supra note 94.
103 See, e.g., Ma Gengxin, Wanshan woguo shangshi gongsi duli dongshi zhidu jianshe
de sikao [Some Thoughts on Perfecting the Construction of the Independent Director System
in China's Listed Companies], ZHENG-FA LUNTAN [TRIBUNE OF POL. SCI. & L.], Dec. 2002
(No. 6), at 61, 62 (P.R.C.).
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model is the exception, not the rule,'0 and in any case in China's
circumstances it is far from clear that dispersed ownership would be a good
thing. As a shareholder's ability to exploit the minority increases, so does
its ability to monitor management for the benefit of all. Which of the two
effects will dominate cannot be known a priori.
Several studies of Chinese listed companies have found that, in
general, performance is positively correlated with concentrated
ownership, o0 at least to a point, and negatively correlated with dispersed
ownership.106 The explanation typically offered is that large shareholders
reduce the free rider problem of small, dispersed shareholders and are thus
able to monitor management more effectively. In addition, dispersed
ownership is especially costly in a society without the institutions that give
the minority what little power and influence it might have, such as a well-
functioning legal system and an active financial information industry.
While finding that concentrated ownership is generally a good thing
among Chinese listed companies, the same studies also find that
performance is negatively correlated to the proportion of state shares and
positively correlated to the proportion of legal person shares in the total
capital stock.107 Thus, it is not simply any large shareholder that will do.
The large shareholder must be an institutional shareholder that is separate
enough from the state so as not to be counted as a holder of state shares.
Research on U.S. firms suggests that the relationship between firm
104 See Bergl6f & von Thadden, supra note 92, at 4 (observing that the widely held firm
is rare in most countries, including transition economies).
105 "Concentrated ownership" must be understood here to mean concentrated ownership
by state agencies or legal persons because concentrated ownership by individuals is virtually
unknown.
106 See, e.g., LU Hui & Wu Xingming, Shangshi gongsi guquan jiegou yu gongsi zhili
[The Stock Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance of Listed Companies], JINGJI
TIZHI GAIGE [REFORM OF EcoN. Sys.], July 2004 (No. 4), at 88, 89-90 (P.R.C.) (reviewing
various studies); Yu Xiaoming, Zhongguo shangshi gongsi de guquan jiegou yu gongsi
jixiao [The Shareholding Structure of Chinese Listed Companies and Corporate Results],
SHIJIF JINGJI [WORLD ECoN.], May 2003 (No. 9), at 50 (P.R.C.) (finding the best results
when the largest shareholder holds between 20% and 50%, and the worst results when
holdings exceed 50%); Jian Chen, Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, 34 EcoN. PLAN. 53, 69 (2001);
Daqing Qi et al., Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance ofPartially Privatized
Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies, 8 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 587, 594 (2000); Sun
Yongxiang & Huang Zuhui, Shangshi gongsi de guquan jiegou yu jixiao [Shareholding
Structure and Performance in Listed Companies], JINGJI YANJIU [ECON. RES.], No. 12, 1999,
at 23-30 (P.R.C.); Xu & Wang, supra note 47, at 86-87.
107 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 106, at 68; Qi et al., supra note 106, at 604-05; Xu &
Wang, supra note 47, at 88; Lin Ling & Dong Hong, Faren zhilijiegou yu jingyingixiao:
Lai zi gao keji shangshi gongsi de shizhengfenxi [Legal Person Governance Structure and
Operational Results: An Empirical Analysis of High Technology Listed Companies], in
GONGSI FA XIUGAI ZONGHENG TAN [AN ALL-AROUND DiscussioN OF REFORM OF THE
COMPANY LAW] 204 (Guo Feng & Wang Jian eds., Falti Chubanshe 2000) (P.R.C.).
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performance and ownership concentration is an inverted V: as concentration
rises, performance rises at first, but then declines as concentration rises still
further. 0 8 The explanation, according to Shleifer and Vishny, is that "as
ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full
control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private
benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders." 09
Yet the opposite pattern, if anything, has been observed in Chinese
firms: one study found that performance, as measured by the ratio of market
value to book value, followed a U-shaped curve as ownership concentration
by legal person shareholders increased.10 Indeed, the same pattern was
observed with respect to state shareholding."' Another study found that
performance peaked when the largest shareholder held 30% to 50% of the
stock, and was worst when no shareholder held more than 30%.112
The standard explanation is that individual investors at first fear
expropriation by such shareholders-that they will use their influence to
expropriate-but believe that as their stake rises, the interests of the legal
person shareholders will become more congruent with theirs. In other
words, a controlling shareholder's ability to expropriate remains constant
whether it owns 51% or 91%, but its incentive to do so declines as its
financial interest in the corporation increases.
This explanation has no less surface plausibility than the one offered
by Shleifer and Vishny for the opposite effect. What this suggests is not
that the explanations are too glib, but rather that the institutional differences
between China and the United States are profound and lessons learned in
one country may not be readily applicable to the other. Until further
research is done, perhaps the most that can be safely said is that
concentrated ownership by non-state shareholders is probably by and large
a good thing that should not be discouraged by the law' 3-there is some
108 See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity
Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 595 (1990); Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity
Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings, 23 J.
FIN. ECON. 3 (1989). But see Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. EcON. 1155 (1985) (finding no significant
correlation between ownership concentration and profit rates for 511 large corporations).
'09 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 16, at 759.
no See Xu & Wang, supra note 47, at 91.
" See Lihui Tian, Government Shareholding and the Value of China's Modern Firms
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 395, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=299936.
112 See Lin Ling & Dong Hong, supra note 107, at 205.
113 See Lixin Colin Xu, Tian Zhu & Yi-Min Lin, Politician Control, Agency Problems
and Ownership Reform: Evidence from China, 13 ECON. TRANSITION 1 (2005) (finding that
private ownership per se was insufficient to reduce agency costs, that concentrated private
ownership was required, and that dispersed private ownership led to worse performance in
Chinese companies).
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evidence that it is valued by the market' l4-and that public shareholders are
probably capable of taking the possibility of dominant-shareholder
expropriation into account.
C. Gatekeepers: Lawyers and Accountants
Persons and institutions involved in information distribution and
gatekeeping-including lawyers, accountants, securities analysts,
underwriters, and the financial press-play an important role in corporate
governance in many jurisdictions. The theory is that because they are
repeat players whose income depends on reputation, the gains from
maintaining that reputation will outweigh the gains from defecting and
cooperating in fraud and mismanagement. Corporate insiders, on the other
hand, are thought to have the opposite set of incentives."'
To perform their functions, all players must of course be appropriately
motivated. If lawyers and accountants bear no responsibility for their
opinions, one cannot expect them to press their corporate clients to correct a
state of affairs that damages shareholders. Similarly, one cannot expect
much from the financial press if the rewards for providing accurate
information are less than the rewards for not doing so.
Neither the legal nor the accounting profession in China is yet well
equipped to play an effective gatekeeper role. The SEC has been able to
delegate much of its supervisory burden to both professions in the United
States because they are capable of handling the task. By contrast, China's
lawyers are few in number and, like its accountants, are not trained to
handle complex financial matters.116 Chinese law schools do not teach such
topics, and the modern legal profession has not yet accumulated enough
experience to enable juniors to learn from seniors on the job.
The position of the accounting profession is even worse. China has
few qualified accountants.' 17 A 2001 study of 32 randomly selected audit
114 See Qi et al., supra note 106, at 609; Xu & Wang, supra note 47, at 95. A problem
with both of these studies is that they appear to assume that a given proportion of legal
person shareholding is more concentrated than the same proportion of individual
shareholding. This is probably true as an empirical matter, but it is not a necessary
characteristic of legal person ownership.
115 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 595-607 (1984). But see Coffee, supra note 5 (arguing that reputation
is not as effective a policing mechanism as is commonly assumed).
116 On the capabilities of the Chinese legal profession, see generally STANLEY B.
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 157 (1999); and
PEERENBOOM, supra note 4, at 343-393. On the accounting profession, see TENEV &
ZHANG, supra note 59, at 120-23.
117 See Barney Jopson, Beiing in Overseas Accountancy Deal, FT.COM, July 25, 2006,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/20f80c6a-lb91-11db-bl64-0000779e2340.html?nclick check=1
(describing plans for foreign training of Chinese accountants and teachers of accountancy).
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reports found "gravely inaccurate errors" in 23 of them."8 So bad did
things become that then-Premier Zhu Rongji called for foreign auditing
firms to conduct supplemental audits of all listed firms in China. " And the
securities industry seems almost beyond redemption: a CSRC investigation
revealed that in the notorious market manipulation scheme of LO Liang, 125
securities firms actively assisted him.120
Lawyers and accountants cannot be expected to play a gatekeeping
role if they bear little or no penalty for failing to do so. The system in
China imposes few such penalties. While law firms and accounting firms
may occasionally be sanctioned by the CSRC, I know of no lawsuits by
misled investors against either. And firms seeking listings continue to use
the same group of law and accounting firms without suffering any apparent
penalty in the market.
1. Accounting Firms as Gatekeepers
It is not simply their low level of accounting skills that prevents
accounting firms from performing a gatekeeping role. A more important
reason is that they simply have no strong incentive to do so.
Accountants can be subjected to legal sanctions in three ways: through
criminal proceedings, through administrative proceedings, and through
private litigation.
Civil liability of accounting firms for the general tort of certification of
false financial information has developed only fitfully in the post-Mao era.
An early set of State Council regulations from 1986 stated that accounting
firms making false or improper certifications of matters such as financial
statements and capital contributions were liable for administrative
punishments of a warning, fine, suspension of business, or dissolution.121
Accountant liability was broadened at least in theory in 1994, when the
Law on Registered Accountants provided that "[w]hen an accounting firm
violates the provisions of this Law, causing losses to the engaging party
(weituo ren) or another interested party (qita lihai guanxi ren), it should
bear liability for compensation in accordance with law."l 22 In the modern
118 See Bei Hu, Chinese Cookery Books: Mainland Companies Are Reeling from a Year
of Financial Scandals During Which the Audacity of Corporate Wrongdoers Has Put Their
Western Counterparts to Shame, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 2002, at 1.
119 See Bei Hu, Tough Audit Rules Eased After Outcry from Interest Groups, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Mar. 2, 2002, at B3; Richard McGregor, Creative Chinese Accounting
Creates Work for Andersen: Scandals Involving Local Firms are Boosting the Big Five, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 20.
120 See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 33, at 156-57.
121 See Zhuce kuaijishi tiaoli [Regulations on Certified Accountants] (promulgated by the
St. Council, July 3, 1986), arts. 11, 27 (P.R.C.).
122 Zhuce kuaijishi fa [Law on Certified Accountants] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994), art. 42 (P.R.C.).
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Chinese legal system, however, broad language such as this can sometimes
make courts reluctant, rather than eager, to read expansive plaintiffs' rights
into a statute. The Supreme People's Court then issued a series of
instructions to lower courts to accomplish this task. 123
Most recently, and presumably on the basis of lower-court experience
with earlier interpretations, in 2007 the Supreme People's Court issued yet
another interpretation, this time much lengthier and more detailed than its
predecessors. 1 2 4 This interpretation extended and clarified the conditions
for accountant liability.12 First, it broadened liability to cover all
inaccurate reports, not simply false certifications of contributed capital. 126
Second, it repeated the principle that liability was limited to the amount
falsely certified.12 7 Third, it defined the "interested party" of Article 42 of
the Law on Registered Accountants as a party who, reasonably relying on
or using an inaccurate report (defined broadly) issued by an accounting
firm, engaged in a transaction with the audited firm or engaged in
transactions with its stock or bonds and thereby suffered losses. 12 Fourth,
it provided that accounting firms could avoid liability if they could prove
they were not at fault.12' Fifth-and remarkably-it provided that the
accounting firm could still be liable even when the "interested party" had
123 See Guanyu kuaiji shiwusuo wei qiye chuju xujia yanzi zhengming ying ruhe chuli de
fuhan [Reply Concerning How to Handle Cases in Which an Accounting Firm Issues a False
Capital Contribution Verification Certificate for an Enterprise] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Apr. 4, 1996, effective Apr. 4, 1996) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5, 2010)
(P.R.C.); Guanyu yanzi danwei dui duoge anjian zhaiquan ren sunshi ying ruhe chengdan
zeren de pifu [Reply Concerning How a Capital-Verifying Body Should Bear Liability for
Creditors' Losses in Multiple Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 5, 1997,
effective Jan. 13, 1998) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (P.R.C.); Guanyu kuaiji
shiwusuo wei qiye chuju xujia yanzi zhengming ying ruhe chengdan zeren wenti de pifu
[Reply Concerning the Question of How an Accounting Firm that Issues a False Capital
Contribution Verification Certificate Should Bear Liability] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., June 26, 1998, effective July 1, 1998) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5,
2010) (P.R.C.); Guanyu jinrong jigou wei qiye chuju bushi huozhe xujia yanzi baogao zijin
zhengming ruhe chengdan minshi zeren wenti de pifu [Reply of the Supreme People's Court
on the Question of How Civil Liability Should Be Borne by Financial Institutions that Issue
Inaccurate or False Capital Contribution Verification Certificates or Proofs of Funds]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Feb. 9, 2002, effective Feb. 9, 2002) CHINALAWINFO
(last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (P.R.C.).
124 See Guanyu shenli sheji kuaiji shiwusuo zai shenji yewu huodong zhong minshi
qinquan peichang anjian de ruogan guiding [Several Rules on the Adjudication of Cases
Involving Civil Tort Liability Incurred by Accounting Firms in the Course of Business
Activities] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., June 11, 2007, effective June 15, 2007)
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (P.R.C.).
125 See generally id.
126 Id., art. 5.
127 Id., art. 10.
128 Id., art. 2.
129 Id., art. 7.
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actual knowledge that the report was false and still used it, 3 o although the
amount of the liability could be reduced "in accordance with
circumstances" (zhuoqing).131
Regulations in the field of securities have also targeted false
certifications by accountants and others. The State Council's 1993
Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuance and Trading
of Securities,' a proto-Securities Law, provided for fines and other
administrative punishments for accountants and lawyers, among others,
who provided false or misleading documents (Art. 73) and also called
clearly for civil liability for damages caused to third parties by violation of
the regulations (Art. 77). The 1998 Securities Law and its 2004 revision
both contain provisions stating that accountants and other intermediaries
(including lawyers) who make false or misleading representations or
certifications in the course of securities issuance or trading shall be subject
to specified administrative sanctions, in addition to being civilly liable for
damages. 133  The 1993 Company Law (effective in 1994) and its 2005
revision also contain provisions on auditor liability in certain
circumstances. 134
In summary, then, a civil remedy against accounting firms appears to
have been available since at least 1994. Nevertheless, it seems to have been
rarely used. I have found only seven cases in the last ten years in which
accounting firms have been found civilly liable for inaccurate
certifications. 135 All were suits by creditors who had dealt with the debtor
130 Id., art. 8. It is not clear how the report could be said to have been "used" by someone
who knew it was false.
13' Id.
132 Gupiao faxing yu jiaoyi guanli zanxing tiaoli [Provisional Regulations for the
Administration of the Issuance and Trading of Securities] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Apr. 22, 1993, effective Apr. 22, 1993) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and Trading of Securities].
13 See Zhengquan fa [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999), arts. 161, 189, 202 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 1999 Securities Law]; Zhengquan fa [Securities Law] (amended by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 173, 223 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 2005 Securities Law]. The provisions on civil liability are vague and have been,
as discussed elsewhere in this paper, considerably weakened through the Supreme People's
Court's interpretative rulemaking. Nevertheless, in 2002, the Supreme People's Court
specified that accountants and lawyers could be made defendants in civil suits for false
disclosures under the Securities Law. See Guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang xujia chenshu
yinfa de minshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding [Several Rules on the Adjudication of
Civil Suits for Compensation Brought About by False Disclosures in Securities Markets]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26, 2002, effective Feb. 1, 2003)
CHINALAWINFO (last visited Jan. 5, 2010) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter False Disclosure Rules].
134 See 1993 Company Law, supra note 35, art. 219; 2005 Company Law, supra note 35,
art. 208.
135 This does not, of course, mean that there were only seven such cases. Chinese cases
are not systematically collected and reported, either officially or unofficially. See Donald C.
164
Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions
30:131 (2010)
firm in reliance on the inaccurate certification. In another seven cases,
creditors brought suit on the same grounds but lost. In one case, a creditor
won a re-trial after the first- and second-instance courts erroneously denied
the legal basis of its claim. I found no cases in which buyers or sellers of a
firm's securities sued an accounting firm for certifying inaccurate numbers
as contemplated by the Supreme People's Court's 2007 interpretation.
Whatever its theoretical availability, therefore, the threat of private civil
litigation from investors does not appear to be a realistic constraint on
accounting firms in their work of auditing listed companies.
Administrative sanctions are equally rare, at least in the context of
securities markets. In the four years from 2004 to 2007, the CSRC issued a
total of 160 administrative punishments. In those actions, accountants were
fined for certifying misleading financial information four times in 2004,
three times in 2005, once in 2006, and three times in 2007.136 It may well
be that the CSRC has genuinely more pressing matters on which to spend
its limited resources, but sanctioning accounting firms is apparently not a
high priority.
Finally, criminal proceedings are almost non-existent. Article 229 of
the Criminal Law punishes the intentional or grossly negligent provision of
false certification of facts by lawyers and accountants, among others. 13 7
Prosecutions, however, are rare. A search of two major legal databases1
turned up only six cases. A search of news sources turned up one more
recent case. In this seven-case sample, three cases involved corporate
insiders, and in one, the defendant accountant was acquitted. Only three
cases represent classic examples of liability for accountants for failing in
their duty as gatekeepers.' 3  One of those1 4 0 Stemmed from the Yin
Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 166-67 (Erik Jensen & Thomas
Heller eds., 2003). The case sample discussed here was obtained from news reports and
from a systematic search of the case law database of Chinalawinfo.com.
136 These conclusions are based on the author's analysis of data available at the CSRC
Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn as of Feb. 23, 2008. The website further shows the
following data on sanctions stronger than a warning in earlier years: one in 1993-1998; two
in 1999; one in 2000; two in 2001; three in 2002; and three in 2003.
137 See Xing Fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997), art. 229 (P.R.C.).
138 The databases are available online at http://www.chinalawinfo.com and
http://www.lawyee.com.
139 The three cases are that of Lu Lihe and Ding Yong, see Liang zhuce kuaijishi chuju
zhengming wenjian zhongda shishi bei pan xing [Two Registered Accountants Sentenced for
Issuing Gravely Inaccurate Certificating Documents] (Basic-Level People's Court, Yiping
District, Yibin Municipality, Sichuan, Feb. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=196439 [hereinafter Lu Lihe Case]; that of
Li Junyi, see Di Jianfeng deng xujia zhuce ziben an [The Case of Di Jianfeng et al. Involving
False Registered Capital] (Gansu Province, Kang County Basic-Level People's Court, Jan.
27, 2000), available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?gid=117446692;
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Guangxia case, a well-known corporate scandal comparable to Worldcom
or Enron.141 Another was reported to be the first ever such case in Sichuan
142
province.
2. Law Firms as Gatekeepers
Like accountants, lawyers issue opinions in the context of securities
offerings that must pass muster with the CSRC and on which investors are
expected to rely. Also like accountants, lawyers face a low probability of
sanctions for issuing irresponsible opinions on which investors rely to their
detriment.
Some of the regulations already canvassed that cover misleading
statements and certifications by accountants also cover lawyers in the same
way. The Securities Law, for example, covers lawyers as issuers of legal
opinions and possibly as securities market intermediaries,14 3 as did its
predecessors and supplements: the 1993 Provisional Regulations for the
Administration of the Issuance and Trading of Securities,144 the 1993
Provisional Measures Prohibiting Acts of Securities Fraud,145 and a 2002
interpretation of the Securities Law by the Supreme People's Court. 46 In
addition, a 1999 CSRC document on disclosure obligations states that
lawyers should bear "appropriate legal liability" if they have not adequately
checked the materials on which their legal opinions are based.147
and that of the accountants in the Yin Guangxia scandal, see Dong Bo et al. Tigong xujia
caikuai baogao, chuju zhengming wenjian zhongda shishi an [The Case of Dong Bo et al.
Providing False Financial and Accounting Reports and Issuing Gravely Inaccurate
Certificating Documents] (Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Yinchuan Municipality
Intermediate-Level People's Court, Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?gid=117508210 [hereinafter Dong Bo
Case].
140 See Dong Bo Case, supra note 139.
141 See, e.g., Hu Shuli, Enrons of China, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 1, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 18089331 (Westlaw).
142 See Lu Lihe Case, supra note 139. An official at the Sichuan provincial-level court
stated that prosecutions for the crime in question were quite rare nationwide. See id.
143 See the provisions of the 1999 and 2005 Securities Laws cited in supra note 133.
14 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and Trading of Securities, supra note
132.
145 Jinzhi zhengquan qizha xingwei zanxing banfa [Provisional Measures Prohibiting
Acts of Securities Fraud] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 12, 1993, abolished as
redundant Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://baike.baidu.com/view/434690.htm?fr-alaO
[hereinafter Securities Fraud].
146 See False Disclosure Rules, supra note 133.
147 See Gongkai faxing gupiao gongsi xinxi pilu de neirong yu geshi zhunze di liu hao
(Fali yijian shu de neirong yu geshi) [Standards for the Content and Format of Information
Disclosure by Companies Publicly Issuing Shares (Content and Format of Legal Opinion)]
(promulgated by the CSRC, July 1, 1999), art. 4 (P.R.C.). Particularly in view of the
reluctance of Chinese courts to hear shareholder suits, this is less than an unambiguous grant
of a private right of action to shareholders against lawyers. It is unclear whether the CSRC,
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Private litigation does not appear to play any role in disciplining
lawyers. I have been unable to find any cases in which lawyers have been
held liable for their part in disclosure violations, or even cases in which a
law firm is listed as a defendant. Nor have I been able to find any criminal
cases involving disclosure violations or other aspects of corporate
governance.
The CSRC has occasionally imposed administrative sanctions on law
firms for their part in disclosure violations. These are summarized in Table
1 below.
Table 1: Administrative sanctions against lawyers by CSRC




1996 Disclosure Warning; fine; temporary suspension of







Disclosure Confiscation of unlawfully obtained
violations in IPO income; temporary suspension of license to
do securities-related work
1999 Disclosure Warning; confiscation of unlawfully
violations in IPO obtained income
Disclosure Temporary suspension of firm's license to
violations in IPO do securities-related work; confiscation of
unlawfully obtained income; revocation of
individual lawyer's license to do securities-
related work
167
with less legal status than a ministry, can actually create civil liability.
Northwestern Journal of






Warning; confiscation of unlawfully
obtained income; warnings and fines for
individual lawyer(s) who signed opinion
Warning; confiscation of unlawfully
obtained income; warnings and fines for
individual lawyer(s) who signed opinion
Disclosure Confiscation of unlawfully obtained
violations in IPO income; fine of 250,000 yuan; revocation of
license to do securities-related work of
lawyer(s) who signed opinion
Disclosure Warning to firm and individual lawyers
violations in IPO
Disclosure Criticism of firm and individual lawyers
violations in IPO
Incorrectly Warning; CSRC not to accept legal opinions









Criticism; CSRC not to accept legal
opinions from firm for six months
Source: Peng Bing, Zhengquan liishi xingzheng zeren de shizheng yanjiu
[Empirical Research into the Administrative Liability of Securities
Lawyers], FA SHANG YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW & COMMERCE], No. 6,
2004, at 16 (P.R.C.); author's research.
A few points are worth noting about these sanctioning decisions. First,
the data may be incomplete; some punishment decisions probably do not
show up here. This very absence of publicity, however, makes sanctions
less effective both as deterrents and in their shaming effect. Second, the
disclosure violations in question all seem to have been discovered and
corrected before the sale of stock to the public. In one case the CSRC
simply felt that the offending firm's legal opinion was too vague; in
addition to sending it back for more work, the CSRC imposed a
punishment. Third, the CSRC became considerably tougher in the year
2000, issuing more, and more severe, punishments. Finally, the record of
168
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law firm punishments simply stops at 2000 for reasons that are not clear. A
study published in 2004 stated that as of that date, no punishments had been
imposed for acts that took place after the coming into effect on July 1, 1999
of the Securities Law.14 8  One reason may be that since 2002, lawyer
discipline has largely become the province of local government authorities
and not the CSRC. Thus, disciplining decisions are taking place out of
readily available public view. Clearly, further research is necessary.
D. State Institutions for Corporate Governance (I): The Role of the CSRC
The following sections of this Article will look at state or quasi-state
institutions and their capacity for making rules about corporate governance
and discovering and sanctioning violations. They will also look at the
particular types of violations that are met with sanctions. It must be
remembered, however, that sanctioned violations are only a subset of actual
violations. First, not all discovered violations are sanctioned; the
sanctioning organization has its priorities and will devote resources to
certain areas it deems important to the relative neglect of others. Second,
not all violations are even discovered. On the basis of a survey of listed
companies and securities firms, one scholar concludes that for every
sanctioned violation another one to four violations went undiscovered.149
Given the Chinese state's preference for government over private
solutions, the CSRC is an obvious candidate for an important role in
monitoring and enforcing corporate governance norms. It is therefore
worth examining its powers in detail.
1. Regulatory Authority
a. Regulatory Authority in General
The CSRC has central and local offices that undertake a number of
regulatory tasks, although the precise contours of the CSRC's regulatory
authority are controversial. The first general regulation in the field of
securities-the State Council's Temporary Regulations on the
Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading, 0 considered still to be in
effect today despite the existence of the Securities Law-gave the CSC and
the CSRC under it the authority to regulate "the securities markets"
(zhengquan shichang) and provided that CSRC approval (among many
148 See Peng Bing, Zhengquan lishi xingzheng zeren de shizheng yanjiu [Empirical
Research into the Administrative Liability of Securities Lawyers], FA SHANG YANJIU
[STUDIES IN LAW & COMMERCE], No. 6, 2004, at 16, 18 (2004) (P.R.C.).
149 See Wu Xiaoliang, Zhengquan fanzui chengiie yanjiu [Research into the Punishment
of Securities Crimes], CAIJING.COM, June 22, 2005, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2005-06-22
(reporting research of Professor Bai Jianjun of Beijing Univ. Faculty of Law) (P.R.C.).
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others) was required for listing. The 1999 Securities Law, China's first
comprehensive legislation on the subject, gave the CSRC the power to
regulate issuers, securities markets, and market intermediaries, and allowed
it to delegate certain regulatory functions to the exchanges, which
nevertheless remained under its tight control-the CSRC still appoints their
leaders, for example."5 ' It confirmed the CSRC's approval power over
public issuances of stock. 5 2
At the core of the CSRC's authority over companies seeking listing or
already listed is its regulation of their disclosure of information. Moreover,
it has traditionally not been reluctant to review share offerings for
substantive merit as well as for adequacy of disclosure.1 53 Indeed, until the
end of 2005, a public listing was conditional upon the issuer's showing
profits for the three preceding years.
Even disclosure itself is directed at the needs of merit review by a state
agency, not at providing information to the investing public. The public has
no right of access to disclosures made to the CSRC; instead, the law
typically-but not always-provides that disclosures made to the CSRC
must also be made in some designated public forum.154
b. Corporate Governance Initiatives
Beyond disclosure, the CSRC has interpreted its regulatory authority
broadly, extending as far as attempting to exercise censorship over the
financial press. Because this Article is concerned with corporate
governance issues, it will look more narrowly at the CSRC's considerable
initiatives in this area-initiatives that have gone well beyond the realm of
disclosure regulation. Over the years the CSRC has issued numerous
documents of varying and often uncertain degrees of binding force.
Although a full list would be otiose, a partial list in chronological order will
afford some idea of the breadth of its regulatory reach.
* In 1994, the CSRC issued, jointly with the State Commission on
Reform of the Economic System (SCRES), a document containing
provisions required in the articles of association of Chinese companies
seeking permission to list outside the mainland (including in Hong Kong)
151 See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133, art. 10; 2005 Securities Law, supra note
133, art. 10.
152 id
153 See Sheng Xuejun, Woguo zhengquan jianguan fali zhidu moshi [The Legal System
Model of Securities Regulation in China], XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW SCIENCE], No. 2,
2001, at 116, 117 (P.R.C.); SANZHU ZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 181 (2000).
154 A person required by the Securities Law to make a tender offer must submit to the
CSRC a report containing various details of its intentions, but need announce to the public
only the fact of its offer. See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133, art. 82; 2005 Securities
Law, supra note 133, art. 10.
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("1994 Mandatory Articles")."s
* In 1997, it issued what was essentially a domestic counterpart to the
1994 Mandatory Articles, the Guidance Articles of Association for Listed
Companies ("1997 Guidance Articles")' 5 6-in effect, a mini-Company
Law. The 1997 Guidance Articles were revised and reissued in 2006.15
* In 1999, together with the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC), it issued further guidelines on corporate governance in companies
listed abroad in the Opinion on Further Promoting the Normalized
Operation and Deepened Reform of Companies Listed Abroad ("Opinion
on Further Reform")."' Like the 1997 Guidance Articles, the Opinion on
Further Reform went deep into the heart of traditional corporate governance
territory, gurporting to impose a duty of loyalty and diligence upon
directors.
* In August 2001, it issued its Guidance Opinion on the Establishment
of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies ("Independent
Direct Opinion").160  Covering all companies listed on Chinese stock
exchanges (but not Chinese companies listed overseas), this opinion
required all listed companies to have a one-third independent board by mid-
2003 and called for the independent directors to have various powers. 61
* In a January 2002 notice addressed to listed companies, the CSRC
issued its Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
("Principles").16 2  Contemporary commentary stated that the Principles
1ss See Guanyu zhixing "Dao jingwai shangshi gongsi zhangcheng bibei tiaokuan de
tongzhi" [Notice on Implementing the "Mandatory Articles of Association for Companies
Listing Abroad"] (promulgated by the CSRC & the St. Comm'n for Restructuring Econ.
Sys., Aug. 27, 1994) 1994 Zheng wei fa 21(P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1994 Mandatory Articles].
156 Guanyu fabu "Shangshi gongsi zhangcheng zhiyin" de tongzhi [Notice on the
Issuance of the "Guidance Articles of Association for Listed Companies"] (promulgated by
the CSRC, Dec. 16, 1997) 1997 Zhengjian 16 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 1997 Guidance Articles].
1s7 See Guanyu yinfa "Shangshi gongsi zhangcheng zhiyin (2006 Nian Xiuding)" de
tongzhi [Notice on the Printing and Distribution of the "Guidance Articles of Association for
Listed Companies (2006 Revision)"] (promulgated by the CSRC, Mar. 16, 2006) 2006
Zhengjian gong si zi 38 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Guidance Articles].
15 Guanyu jinyibu cujin jingwai shangshi gongsi guifan yunzuo he shenhua gaige de
yijian [Opinion on Further Promoting the Normalized Operation and Deepened Reform of
Companies Listed Abroad] (promulgated by the CSRC & the St. Econ. and Trade Comm'n,
Mar. 29, 1999) 1999 Guo jing mao qi gai 230 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Opinion on Further
Reform].
15 See id., sec. 3.
160 Guanyu zai shangshi gongsi jianli duli dongshi zhidu de zhidao yijian [Guidance
Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies]
(promulgated by the CSRC, Aug. 16, 2001) 2001 Zheng jian fa 102 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Independent Director Opinion]. The Opinion and related issues are discussed thoroughly in
Clarke, supra note 62.
161 See id.
162 Shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze [Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies] (promulgated by the CSRC & the St. Econ. and Trade Comm'n, Jan. 7, 2002)
171
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:131 (2010)
were based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, as modified
by appropriate principles drawn from specific foreign jurisdictions and
China's own particular situation.163
* In December 2004, it issued Several Provisions on Strengthening the
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders ("Public Shareholder
Provisions").164 The Public Shareholder Provisions contain a number of
corporate governance rules aimed directly at abuses by controlling
shareholders that had come to be perceived by the policy community
(probably correctly) as rampant.16 Most significantly, the Public
Shareholder Provisions contain voting rules on certain matters that directly
contradicted specific rules in the Company Law.' 66
The degree of the CSRC's authority to regulate in the field of pure
corporate governance, as it were, is not completely clear. There are some
grounds for its assertion of wide authority. The 1995 Temporary
Regulations on Stock Trading included among the conditions for listing
"other conditions stipulated by the Securities Commission" (i.e., the CSC)
without indicating any limitations on the CSC's ability to prescribe
conditions, thus apparently giving it carte blanche.167 The 1999 Securities
Law also allowed the CSRC to require the submission of whatever
documents it deems relevant, again without any apparent limitation.168 The
2005 Securities Law, however, requires State Council approval of CSRC-
imposed conditions,169 possibly in response to a sense that the CSRC had
been going well beyond its traditional mandate.
As far as statutory texts are concerned, therefore, it is difficult to find
any specific limitation on the subject matter of the CSRC's jurisdiction.
The statutes granting regulatory authority to the CSRC do contain language
that could-if one wished-be read as imposing at least some broad
2002 Zheng jian fa 1, art. 21 [hereinafter Principles].
163 See Shan Yuqing, Youguan zhuanjia zhichu shangshi gongsi zhilijiegou de quexian
shi zhongguo ziben shichangfazhan mianlin dejuda tiaozhan [Relevant Experts Point Out
that Shortcomings in the Governance Structure of Listed Companies Are a Great Challenge
Facing the Development of Capital Markets in China], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA
ECON. TIMES], July 9, 2001; Tang Xin, Zhongguo shangshi gongsi zhili huanjing de xin
fazhan [New Developments in the Governance Environment for Chinese Listed Companies]
(Tsinghua Univ. 21st Century Commercial Law Forum, 2001) (P.R.C.).
' Guanyu fabu "Guanyu jiaqiang shehui gongzhong gu gudong quanyi de ruogan
guiding" de tongzhi [Notice on the Issuance of the "Several Provisions on Strengthening the
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders"] (promulgated by the CSRC, Dec. 7, 2004)
2004 Zheng Jian Fa 118 [hereinafter Public Shareholder Provisions].
161 See id.
'6 Id., art. 1.
167 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and Trading of Securities, supra note
132, art. 8(7). To my knowledge, no serious argument has been made in China that the
CSRC did not succeed to this grant of authority to the CSC.
168 See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133, art. 11.
169 See 2005 Securities Law, supra note 133, arts. 12, 13.
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limitations: the 1993 Stock Trading Temporary Regulations, the 1999
Securities Law, and the 2005 Securities Law all state that the CSRC (or the
CSC) has authority to regulate "the securities markets."l7 0
Some academic commentators have questioned whether the CSRC has
authority to make any rules at all. They argue that the CSRC is an
"institutional unit" (shiye danwei), not a fully-fledged administrative
department under the State Council authorized by the Constitution to
formulate regulations within its sphere of competence.'71  It exercises
delegated power, and thus can only apply rules, not make them.17 2 Still
less, they argue, can it make rules providing for the imposition of
punishments such as banning. 73
Ultimately, efforts to undertake a legal analysis of the CSRC's powers
arguably miss the point by assuming that such an analysis is meaningful in
the Chinese legal system. Chinese administrative agencies simply do not
act according to a model of legally defined subject matter competence. 174
The CSRC has such power as it can successfully assert. The main
limitations on its authority are probably better understood as political, not
legal.
2. Enforcement Tools
The CSRC tries to induce compliance with its wishes with a number of
tools of varying effectiveness. Its two key weapons are (a) its power to
review applications for public share offerings and to grant or refuse
permission;175 and (b) its power to investigate and punish violations of laws
and regulations relating to securities. 176 Sometimes it threatens to use these
powers; other times, intriguingly, it does not. Still other times it simply
declares that certain acts will not be valid under certain conditions, but it
does not automatically follow that other government agencies in China,
particularly courts, will give effect to that declaration if it seems to go
beyond the CSRC's authority.
170 See 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and Trading of Securities, supra
note 132, art. 5; 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133, art. 7; 2005 Securities Law, supra note
133, art. 7.
171 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see ZHU, supra note 153, at 53-54.
172 See Zhou Weixin, Zhongguo zhengjian hui "Zhengquan shichangjinru zhidu zanxing
guiding" de quexian pingxi [A Critique of the Shortcomings of the CSRC's "Temporary
Rules on Prohibiting Entry to the Securities Market"], FAXUE [LEGAL Sci.], No. 4, 1998, at
60, 61 (P.R.C.).
173 See id. at 62.
174 This and the following propositions are not self-evident; unfortunately, there is
insufficient space here to establish them by argument.
'7 See 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133, art. 10; 2005 Securities Law, supra note
133, art. 10.
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a. Refusal to Approve Applications for Stock Issuance
Standards for listing can be enforced in a straightforward way: the
CSRC can refuse to approve applications that do not meet such standards,
and indeed the exposition of those standards may not even need to contain
the threat of non-approval. For example, the 1994 Mandatory Articles177
contain no explicit threat of non-approval where a company applying to list
shares abroad submits a non-conforming version of its articles of
association; it is perhaps too obvious to require stating.
b. Refusal to Accept Applications for Stock Issuance or Other Matters
Distinct from a refusal to approve applications is a refusal to accept
them. In Chinese legal and administrative practice, "acceptance" of an
application (or petition, or lawsuit) by a governmental body is a formal act;
the term could be translated as "docketing." Thus, making an application
involves more than simply submitting the necessary documents. It also
involves a formal acceptance of the submission by the authority to which
the application is made. Many of the CSRC's regulatory documents are
accompanied by the threat that non-compliance by companies will be
punished by the CSRC's refusal, for a given time period, to accept
applications respecting the various matters over which the CSRC has
approval power, most notably (but not necessarily) the issuance of stock.
c. Fines
The CSRC's power to impose fines is set forth in detail in Chapter 11
of the Securities Law, which lists a series of specific offenses based on the
rules spelled out elsewhere in the statute for which the CSRC may impose a
fine. Because the Securities Law does not specify internal corporate
governance standards, however, it follows that it does not prescribe fines
for violations of such standards. Nor does it give the CSRC carte blanche
to impose fines whenever the CSRC's own rules are violated. Nevertheless,
the CSRC has threatened fines for violation of corporate governance
standards. In the 1996 Listed Company Standards,78 for example, non-
compliance was stated to be punishable by fines under the "relevant
provisions" of the 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and
Trading of Securities. But it is hard to find any "relevant provisions" in the
Regulations justifying fines for the acts prohibited by the Standards. "9
1n 1994 Mandatory Articles, supra note 155.
178 See Guanyu guifan shangshi gongsi xingwei ruogan wenti de tongzhi [Notice on
Several Issues in Standardizing the Behavior of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the
CSRC, July 24, 1996) 1996 Zheng Jian Shang Zi 7, para. 7 [hereinafter 1996 Listed
Company Standards].
179 See 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Issuance and Trading of Securities, supra
note 132, art. 70.
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d. Banning from the Market
The sanction of banning from the market was first introduced by the
CSRC in 1997 with the Temporary Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into
Securities Markets ("1997 Temporary Rules").80 A revised version entitled
Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into Securities Markets 8 1 appeared in
June 2006 ("2006 Market Entry Prohibition"). Among other things, the
1997 Temporary Rules and their successor provide that persons can be
prohibited, either for a limited time or for life, from serving as senior
officer, director, or supervisor in a listed company. Although no
punishment is stated for persons who defy the ban, listed companies that
employ such persons in defiance of the ban are subject to unstated
administrative sanctions to be imposed by the CSRC.18 2 The CSRC may
also refuse to accept their applications for approvals on any matter, and may
direct the exchanges to suspend trading in their stock."1 3 Curiously, these
enforcement mechanisms were all removed from the 2006 successor
version of the 1997 Temporary Rules. The only stated enforcement
mechanism in the 2006 Market Entry Prohibition is a public announcement
of the banning and a record in the individual's "good-faith file" (chengxin
dang'an) maintained by the CSRC.
The 1997 Temporary Rules provided a list of offenses. 8 4 The list did
not, however, specifically include any offenses related to internal corporate
governance, although it did include a catch-all at the end for "serious
violations of securities laws, [administrative] regulations, [ministry-level]
rules, and relevant CSRC rules.""ss Thus, if the CSRC made rules about
internal corporate governance, it could under the 1997 Temporary Rules
punish their violation with a ban on market entry. This seems to have been
what the CSRC had in mind when it promulgated its Several Provisions on
Strengthening the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders ("Public
Shareholder Provisions").'" The Public Shareholder Provisions declare
180 See Guanyu yinfa "Zhengquan shichang jinru zanxing guiding" de tongzhi [Notice on
the Printing and Distribution of the "Temporary Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into
Securities Markets"] (promulgated by the CSRC, Mar. 3, 1997) 1997 Zheng Jian 7 (repealed
2006) [hereinafter 1997 Temporary Rules].
181 Zhengquan Shichang Jinru Guiding [Rules on the Prohibition of Entry into Securities
Markets] (promulgated by the CSRC, June 7, 2006, effective July 10, 2006) CSRC Decree
No. 33 [hereinafter 2006 Market Entry Prohibition].
182 See id, art. 6. The basis upon which the CSRC could have imposed such sanctions is
not clear, given that they are not specified in the document itself.
18 See id., art. 5.
184 See 1997 Temporary Rules, supra note 180, art. 4. Possibly due to a drafting
oversight, the CSRC did not in the 1997 Temporary Rules give itself the power to prevent
malefactors not already officers, directors, or supervisors from becoming such. This was
corrected in the 2006 Market Entry Prohibition.
85 Id., art. 4(7).
186 See Public Shareholder Provisions, supra note 164.
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that senior management personnel have a duty of good faith and loyalty,
and threaten to ban from the market those who violate them.
The sanction of banning received a firmer basis in Article 233 of the
Securities Law as revised in 2005, but it is still not clear how banning will
be enforced against a defiant party.
e. Reprimands and Other Soft Sanctions
Finally, a few words should be said about reprimands, warnings, and
similar sanctions. On their face, they would seem of doubtful effectiveness,
and they do not seem to be feared by corporate and individual wrongdoers.
To the extent that a corporate officer is in effect a state official-and that
will be true in certain companies closely connected to the state-a
reprimand or warning could hurt his or her chances for further promotion
within the civil service. 187 But as corporate officials become more like
private businesspersons, the effect of such sanctions can be expected to
decrease.
In 2002, the CSRC announced the establishment of the "good faith
file" system.'88 According to then-Vice Chairman Laura Cha, directors,
supervisors, and senior officers who committed violations of "good faith"
(chengxin) would, in accordance with listing rules, have their qualifications
to hold their posts "restricted" (xianzhi). Furthermore, listed companies
found guilty of violations of good faith would find that when the CSRC
accepted (shouli) their reports on various matters, it would "consider" their
good faith record in order to raise the costs of violations.189
Following up on the CSRC's lead, in 2004 the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange announced the establishment of a good-faith file system of its
own for small and medium-sized enterprises. According to the governing
regulations, violations of good faith by listed companies and their officers,
directors, and supervisors would be recorded and made public.' 90
Needless to say, this is all very vague, and the CSRC's jurisdiction to
judge and punish the violation of such a nebulous duty is questionable. In
fact, however, so far as the records of CSRC actions on its Web site shows,
18' This explanation of the punitive effect of a reprimand was suggested to me by a
CSRC official.
188 See Zheng jian hui jianli zhengquan shichang canyu zhuti de chengxin dang'an
[CSRC Establishes Good Faith File System for Securities Market Participants], XINHUA
WANG [XINHUA NET], Apr. 23, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-
04/23/content 368574.htm (P.R.C.); see also Zaogao de chengxin jilu [The Mess of Good
Faith Records], IT JINGLI SHIRE [IT MANAGER'S WORLD], Nov. 20, 2004, at 20 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter The Mess ofGood Faith Records].
189 See The Mess of Good Faith Records, supra note 188.
190 See Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyisuo zhong-xiao qiye ban shangshi gongsi chengxin
jianshe zhiyin [Shenzhen Stock Exchange Guidelines for the Establishment of Good Faith in
Listed Companies on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board] (June 24, 2004) (P.R.C),
available at http://www.szse.cn/main/en/smeboard/smeboardrules/200 4 11126445.shtml.
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as of the end of 2007 the CSRC had not once imposed a punishment for
what might be called a violation of the duty of good faith per se. Nor did
the record of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as of that date appear very
different: every report of a sanction that I examined was for a disclosure
violation-that is, a violation of the Securities Law-and nothing less
legally solid.
Thus, the "good faith file" system seems to be more about putting a
general name to a method of recording sanctions for violations of statutory
duties than about judging and punishing a new kind of duty.
f. "Comply or Explain"
The CSRC has occasionally adopted a more flexible "comply or
explain" approach to its corporate governance standards. This, for example,
is the approach taken, at least as a formal matter, by the 2002 Principles of
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies ("Principles").'91 Although
the CSRC would probably not wish to label them optional, Article 91 seems
to contemplate that corporate governance practices may diverge from those
called for in the Principles, and requires disclosure of the existence of and
reasons for such divergence. Logically, however, if the rest of the
Principles are not mandatory, it is hard to see how the disclosure
requirement itself could be mandatory.19 2
In some jurisdictions, the "comply or explain" approach is used
because regulatory authorities recognize that what might be a good idea
most of the time is not a good idea all of the time, and that case-by-case
judgment by an informed market is superior to a strict rule. The
effectiveness of this approach, however, has been questioned.' 93
191 Principles, supra note 162.
192 By way of contrast, consider the mechanics of the comply-or-explain approach in
other countries. In Germany, for example, a governmental commission produced the
German Corporate Governance Code. The comply-or-explain rule, however, is contained
not in the Code, which is not mandatory, but in the Public Corporations Act. See
AKTIENGESSELSCHAFTEN [LAW ON STOCK CORPORATIONS] § 161 (F.R.G), translated in
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: GERMANY (rev. ed. 1995); see generally Klaus J. Hopt &
Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy § 2.1 (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 18/2004, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-487944.
9 See Eric Nowak, Roland Rott & Till G. Mahr, The (Ir)relevance of Disclosure of
Compliance with Corporate Governance Codes-Evidence from the German Stock Market
(Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 06-11, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=891106 (finding that firm value is
unaffected by announcements of firms' compliance behavior); lain MacNeil & Xiao Li,
"Comply or Explain ": Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14
CORP. Gov. 486, 494 (2006) (finding that "investors do not value reasoned arguments for
non-compliance and prefer to use financial performance as a proxy to determine when non-
compliance can be excused").
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3. Summary: What Role Can the CSRC Play in Corporate Governance?
In terms of corporate governance, the CSRC's tasks and powers can be
summed up as follows:
* It reviews offering documents for conformity with disclosure
requirements and substantive merit.
* It formulates rules and recommendations regarding both disclosure
and internal corporate governance.
* It attempts to monitor the implementation of the above rules and
recommendations and to discourage violations.
These tasks are in addition to its many other tasks, such as regulating
stock exchanges and market intermediaries and indeed intervening in the
market when it deems it necessary.19 4 In other words, the CSRC has much
to keep it busy, and a key question is whether it can perform its various
missions effectively.
As the above review of documents issued by the CSRC has shown, it
is not reluctant to tell listed companies how they should manage their
internal affairs. Yet the review of enforcement actions actually taken by the
CSRC, at least insofar as they appear in the public record, suggests that it
actually devotes very few resources to ensuring that such internal corporate
governance norms are actually put into practice.
A technique the CSRC has often used is to require-or at least to
attempt to require-listed companies to adopt certain norms as part of their
articles of association instead of purporting to enact those norms directly as
regulations. It did so with the 1994 Mandatory Articles, where its authority
to do so was unquestioned, but also with documents of more uncertain
194 There is no doubt that the CSRC sees as one of its tasks the support of the market:
Not only retail investors, but also many government officials, remain of the view
that the proper function of securities markets is to go up: the CSRC has been
criticized for causing markets to fall through overenthusiastic enforcement. Even
the CSRC itself is wary of overregulation-not in the sense of making too many
rules, but in the sense of enforcing existing rules-for precisely the same reason.
Many in the financial services industry argue that a certain amount of willful
blindness on the part of regulators is necessary, at least at the current stage, for
public confidence to continue because that confidence is driven more by a
continually rising market than by knowledge that corporate governance is sound.
Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role ofLaw in China's Economic
Development, in CHINA'S GREAT ECONoMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 420 (Thomas Rawski &
Loren Brandt ed., 2008); see also Green, supra note 82. As part of its mission to support
markets, for example, in August 1994 the CSRC imposed a freeze on new stock issues in
order to raise stock prices by restricting supply. See ZHU, supra note 153, at 183. And in
May 2008, the CSRC threatened to punish mutual fund managers who dumped shares along
with other investors during a market downturn. See Daniel Ren, Beying Resorts to Threats
to Stop Stocks Slide, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 31, 2008, at 1.
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legitimacy.195
Take, for example, the 1997 Guidance Articles.19 6  These were
contained in a notice that was addressed to the securities regulatory offices
of local governments at the provincial level.19 7 Declining to attempt to
enforce the implementation of these guidelines itself, the CSRC asked local
governments to ensure that companies under their jurisdiction amended
their articles of association to reflect the guidelines. Similarly, in the
Independent Director Opinion, the CSRC called for independent directors
to have various powers, but attempted to realize this goal through having
companies write these powers into their articles of association or other
internal rules.198
Many commentators treat such norms as if they were mandatory norms
of corporate governance in China. In fact, they are twice removed from the
level of binding norm. First, whether companies in fact amend their articles
of association in conformity with the CSRC's wishes is an open question
that has not to my knowledge been studied. Second, even if companies do
amend their articles of association, those articles, like any other set of rules,
are meaningless without an enforcement mechanism.
The CSRC does not directly enforce corporate articles of association;
the enforcement mechanism, if any, is private litigation in courts-probably
on what is essentially a contract theory-by plaintiffs injured by a
company's failure to follow the rules. My own research has so far failed to
uncover a single case in which plaintiffs won a lawsuit for the infringement
of rights derived only from the articles of association.'9 If the articles of
association of listed companies do in fact contain all the desired rules, then
either they are being followed faithfully or else they are simply not
justiciable as a practical matter. Since the first alternative seems unlikely, it
is thus far from clear that the CSRC's back-door route to the enforcement of
corporate governance norms is at all effective.
What, then, about the front-door route? Does the CSRC use its
punishment power to back up its corporate governance norms? Here, the
answer is clearly no. From 2002 through 2007 the CSRC issued a total of
211 punishment decisions (chufa jueding).20 Of those, 99 were for
disclosure violations involving listed companies or their officers, directors,
or supervisors. None was for a violation of substantive rules of corporate
195 1994 Mandatory Articles, supra note 155.
196 1997 Guidance Articles, supra note 156.
197 It was also addressed to the governments of certain cities that are treated as provinces
for economic planning purposes, and hence have provincial status in certain cases.
I98 ndependent Director Opinion, supra note 160.
199 Thus, I am not counting cases where the norm that was violated-for example, a rule
of equal treatment for all shareholders in the distribution of dividends-is stated both in the
articles and in law.
200 See infra Table 3, where I discuss CSRC punishment decisions from a different angle.
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governance, whether derived from the Company Law or from rules issued
by the CSRC itself.
It may be that enforcement actions are few because the need is small.
But it is more likely either that the CSRC is aware that it is on uncertain
legal ground and thus prefers to resort to informal jawboning, or that it
simply cannot do everything and has made a policy decision to concentrate
its energies on other matters, such as misappropriation of client funds by
securities companies.
There is also a third possibility that cannot be overlooked: that the
CSRC's hesitancy about strong enforcement action in the realm of
corporate governance is part and parcel of its general unwillingness to
enforce standards in its core competence of securities regulation. This
unwillingness stems from its dual mission as market regulator and market
promoter for the state. If the securities markets are not paying good money
for issues of SOE stock, then the CSRC is not doing its job, and if clamping
down on abuses would hurt the markets-for example, by obstructing the
flow of funds into the market from illegal sources-then the CSRC may not
have the political will to do so. It is not because the regulatory framework
is inadequate.20 1
Whatever the reason for the general lack of enforcement, one
conclusion seems clear: corporate governance norms that rely on the CSRC
for implementation may not turn out to be terribly meaningful in the
Chinese corporate world.
E. State Institutions for Corporate Governance (II): The Stock Exchanges
China has two stock exchanges: one in Shenzhen and one in Shanghai.
I discuss them under the heading of "state institutions" because they were
created by the government and operate under even tighter government
control than a public utility. Despite their ostensibly self-regulatory nature,
their leading personnel are directly appointed by the CSRC, 02 and it is not
possible for private citizens to establish any new markets.203 Thus, they
cannot be studied as a civil-society institution arising as a market response
to some social demand.
The stock exchanges have available four sanctioning methods, which
201 This point is developed in greater detail in Green, supra note 82. My own experience
confirms this. During a series of meetings I attended in 2005 with persons involved in the
drafting of the 2005 Securities Law, the complaint was often heard that the CSRC was
unable to clamp down on illegal activity because it lacked various powers under the
Securities Law then in effect. In many cases, however, an examination of the law revealed
that the CSRC did indeed have the powers in question; the problem was that it was unwilling
or unable to use them.
202 Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 14 n. 17.
203 See generally id. at 5 ("China's two stock exchanges are not independent of the state
and lack significant autonomous regulatory authority.").
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are, in ascending order of seriousness: oral warnings, letters of oversight,
criticism notices, and public criticisms.2 04  The exchanges may also
designate individuals as unsuitable to serve as certain officers and directors
of listed companies.205
According to the most comprehensive study to date of stock exchange
sanctions, each of the two exchanges typically issues a few dozen warnings
and criticism notices-neither of which is public-per year. In 2006, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange issued 716 letters of oversight (again, non-
public), although in previous years it had never issued more than 153.206
Between 2001 and 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued 109 public
criticisms against 89 different companies, while the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange issued 149 public criticisms against 116 different companies.207
It is difficult to assess the effect of stock exchange sanctions on
corporate governance. Liebman and Milhaupt characterize public criticisms
as shaming sanctions, and find that they are effective. 208 But it is not clear
what rules or standards such sanctions enforce. The stock exchanges have
promulgated listing rules as well as a variety of other rules and standards-
mostly relating to disclosure, but a few relating to what might be called
internal corporate governance as well. 20 9 But the specific conduct that will
result in sanctions, while known internally, is not made public: "Exchange
officials state that their decision not to make the standards public is due to
the fact that the Chinese market 'is not sophisticated;' officials are
concerned that if companies were aware of the specific standards, they
might manipulate their disclosure so as to avoid sanctions." 2 10
The opacity of the sanctioning standards, as well as the fact that few of
the published rules deal with internal corporate governance matters, means
that at present the stock exchanges cannot be considered an effective
institution for creating or implementing norms of corporate governance.
204 Id. at 15.
205 id.
206 Id. at 15 n.20.
207 Id. at 17.
208 See generally id.
209 For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has issued rules on training for
independent directors, see Shanghai zhengquan jiaoyisuo shangshi gongsi duli dongshi
peixun guanli banfa [Shanghai Stock Exchange Administrative Measures on the Training of
Independent Directors in Listed Companies] (Mar. 23, 2006) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/sserules/sserule20060323b.pdf, and on the
conduct of board meetings in listed companies, see Shanghai zhengquan jiaoyisuo shangshi
gongsi dongshihui yishi shifan guize [Shanghai Stock Exchange Model Rules on the
Conduct of Board of Directors Meetings in Listed Companies] (May 12, 2006) (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/sserules/sseruler20060512a.pdf.
210 Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 16.
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F. State Institutions for Corporate Governance (III): The Court System
1. Introduction
What kind of role can Chinese courts play in a corporate governance
regime? There are a number of tasks for which courts would seem, based
on the experience of other jurisdictions, to be likely candidates.
A corporate governance regime will typically mix bright-line rules (for
example, shareholder voting requirements for particular transactions) with
broad standards such as good faith or reasonableness. Neither type of
norm, of course, will mean anything unless there is a body than can apply it
with skill and reasonable consistency.
Courts are generally considered the most appropriate body to enforce
broad standards such as fiduciary duty because they have the tools to
understand the factual background of the dispute in detail and because they
can develop, whether formally or informally, a kind of jurisprudence based
on actual experience.
Whether Chinese courts can do so, however, is questionable. Chinese
legal theory has traditionally been resolutely against the development of
any kind of case law by courts-the pupil in this case surpassing the
teacher, the civil law systems of Europe, in adherence to this dogma.211
Judges in any case are not accustomed to giving reasoned opinions of the
kind that would allow the development of a case law-based
jurisprudence."'
Second, Chinese courts are subject to the principle of horizontal
accountability in the political system: judges owe their positions to local,
not central, political authorities.2 13  When this fact is combined with the
principle that a plaintiff must generally sue in the court of the defendant's
domicile, local judicial protectionism becomes possible. If the defendant is
a listed corporation, the odds are that it is largely owned and controlled by
the local government where the court sits. If the defendants are executives
of the corporation, they are probably also locally influential people.
Because the courts are accountable to local political power, it will be
difficult for outside plaintiffs to win when they are opposing that power.
211 Recently some movement on this issue has become visible. See, e.g., Donald C.
Clarke, Zhengzhou Court Experiments With System of Precedent, CHINESE LAW PROF BLOG,
Oct. 21, 2005,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china-law_prof blog/2005/10/zhengzhoucourt.html; see
also Fu Weiwei & Zhang Xuliang, Shilun woguo anli zhidao zhidu zhi goujian [A Tentative
Discussion of the Establishment of the Case Guidance System in China], FALO SHIYONG
[APPLICATION OF LAW] (NAT'L JUDGESC. L. J.), No. 1, 2006, at 16, 16 (2006) (P.R.C.).
m But see Colin Hawes, Seeds of Dissent: The Evolution of Published Commercial Law
Court Judgments in Contemporary China, 5 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003) (showing growth in
some areas of reasoned opinions).
213 See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 41-49 (1996).
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But the chief obstacle may simply be the policy question of whether it
is wise to give the Chinese judiciary, with its low level of education and
vulnerability to corruption and political pressure, an important role to play
in the development of Chinese corporate governance norms. There is a cost
to be paid in forgoing the use of broad standards, to be sure: bright-line
rules are invariably over- or under-inclusive, and rule out the very quality of
judgment for which we look to courts. But there is also a cost to be paid in
relying for their elaboration on a body incapable of doing so competently.
Indeed, courts in China have shown themselves unreliable as enforcers
even of relatively clear standards. As discussed elsewhere, they are simply
reluctant to get themselves involved in litigation relating to large
corporations. Even after the SPC slightly opened the door it had previously
closed on shareholder litigation for Securities Law violations, actual
judgments against defendants have been rare and perhaps non-existent.214
2. The Courts and the CSRC
It is important to understand in detail how CSRC procedures and the
court system work together in the context of corporate governance-related
litigation.
The CSRC has authority under the Securities Law to impose
punishments, ranging from warnings to fines, for violation of its provisions.
Understanding its use of this authority is vital for understanding not only
the role of government in corporate governance, but also the role of private
litigation. This is because a very significant amount of private litigation
based on violations of the Securities Law cannot take place unless the
CSRC or other government agency has issued an official punishment.2 15
That condition was imposed in 2003 by the Supreme People's Court in its
Several Provisions on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Damages Arising
out of False Representations in Securities Markets ("2003 SPC
Provisions").2 16 This document was the third of a series of SPC regulations
having the collective effect of barring courts from accepting any
shareholder suits under the Securities Law bringing claims of fraud
(including, apparently, false or misleading disclosures), insider trading, or
market manipulation except where certain conditions were met: in
particular, that the suit was for misleading disclosure and that there had
been a finding to that effect in the form of a criminal conviction or an
administrative punishment imposed by the CSRC or some other
government agency.
214 See, e.g., Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies, supra note 22, at 193.
215 As I will show below, this statement is a slight oversimplification.
216 Guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yinfa de minshi peichang anjian
de ruogan guiding [Several Provisions on the Adjudication of Civil Suits for Damages
Arising out of False Representations in Securities Markets] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Jan. 9, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2003), art. 5, 2003 FA LO QUAN SHU 42 (P.R.C.).
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In short, to get in the courthouse, plaintiffs must typically first get a
key from the CSRC in the form of an official punishment for misleading
disclosure. How likely are they to get such a key? The evidence suggests
not often.
A 1999 Chinese study covering the period from October 1993 to
December 1998 shows very little enforcement action against misleading
disclosures.2 17 In that period, the CSRC issued a total of 60 punishment
decisions in the area of securities issuance and trading (not including
futures). Most of the cases were for price manipulation, for which under
the 2003 SPC Provisions there is now no private remedy. Moreover, only
26.7% of the cases were against issuers; 43.3% were against securities firms
and 8.3% against other intermediaries. Fewer than 15% of the punishments
were issued for misleading disclosure.
Pistor and Xu present data from later years showing punishments
imposed by the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and
other administrative agencies; the picture is much the same (see Table 2).218
217 See Bai Jianjun, Zhengjian hui 60 ge chufa jueding de shizhengfenxi [An Empirical
Analysis of 60 CSRC Punishment Decisions], FAXUE [LEGAL Sa.], No. 11, 1999, at 55, 55-
62 (P.R.C.).
218 See Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies, supra note 22, at 195. There
seem to be problems with the Pistor and Xu data or its interpretation. They report 51
enforcement actions by all relevant regulatory agencies in 2003, of which only 11 were
punishments. The CSRC's web site, however, shows that it issued 40 punishments in 2003.
See CSRC Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). Similarly, Pistor
and Xu report eight punishment decisions by all agencies in 2003, whereas the CSRC's web
site reports 17 issued by the CSRC alone.
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Table 2: Enforcement actions by regulators, 1998-2003
Year Enforcement Of which Number of companies
actions taken by punishment listed on Shanghai and
regulatory Shenzhen Stock
agencies Exchanges
1998 3 3 853
1999 12 9 950
2000 16 7 1088
2001 71 9 1160
2002 62 8 1235
2003 51 11 1287
Source: Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies, supra note 22,
at 195.
* "Regulatory agencies" include the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges, and other government agencies with enforcement power.
Under the 2003 SPC Provisions, punishments imposed by the
exchanges for acts other than misleading disclosures do not provide a key to
the courthouse, so these numbers will overstate to an unknown degree the
potential for private litigation; they represent the maximum number of
violations for which damages in a court action could be sought.
The numbers do not look promising. In 2003, for example, the number
of punishment actions reported by Pistor and Xu (eleven) was less than 1%
of the number of listed companies. According to Pistor and Xu, the
sanctions were usually benign, with warnings quite frequent.219
Furthermore, the actions seem to have been mostly against securities firms,
not against listed companies or their officers.
Even after the issuance of the 2003 SPC Provisions, the number of
punishment decisions for disclosure violations satisfying the conditions of
the Provisions remains low. The second column of the following table
shows formal punishment decisions from 2002 (because such decisions
could have been used as the basis of a private suit under the 2003 SPC
Provisions) through the end of 2007 (reported as of Feb. 23, 2008). The
third column shows which of these decisions might, under a liberal
219 See Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies, supra note 22, at 195-96.
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interpretation, have satisfied the conditions of the 2003 SPC Provisions and
enabled a shareholder to bring a lawsuit.22 0
Table 3: CSRC punishment decisions satisfying SPC conditions for
private litigation, 2002-2007
Year Number of punishment Of which, number






2007 (as of 29 15
Feb. 23,
2008)
Source: CSRC Home Page, http://www.csrc.gov.cn
2010); author's analysis.
(last visited Jan. 5,
The 2003 SPC Provisions also provide a key to the courthouse where a
defendant has been sanctioned by another administrative agency or held
criminally liable. Although precise statistics on such cases are not
available, knowledgeable plaintiffs' law ers put the number of such
additional potential defendants at about 20.
It is hard to know what kind of standard these numbers should be
measured against to make them meaningful. Nevertheless, it seems
plausible to conclude that the number of courthouse keys being distributed
by the CSRC (and other government agencies) is small indeed. According
to a recent study, despite the existence of approximately 110 qualifying
punishments, only about 20 companies had been sued during the period the
Supreme People's Court lawsuit limitations have been in effect. While
one company may have been punished more than once, in which case 110
220 The numbers in this column cannot be wholly objective and are based on my own
analysis of the decisions.
221 See Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 7.
222 id
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qualifying punishments do not necessarily imply 110 suit-eligible
companies, it seems fair to think that many more than 20 companies could
have been sued. When one recalls that to be suit-eligible means that an
authoritative state agency has already made an authoritative finding that
misleading disclosures were in fact made, the number of companies actually
sued seems small.
Among the lawsuits that have been filed, a small number have reached
the stage of judgment or settlement; only a few have resulted in judgments
for plaintiffs. Moreover, after getting a judgment in their favor, plaintiffs
often find that enforcing it is another matter entirely.224
3. Shareholder Derivative Suits
As a final way of understanding the role of courts, this section will
examine shareholder derivative suits as a detailed case study of the
relationship between institutions and the norms of corporate governance.
Robert Clark has labeled the shareholder derivative suit "one of the
most interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms" for large
corporations.225 In China, however, doctrinal and political obstacles have
severely limited its usefulness as a device for policing management
malfeasance. At the same time, lawsuits essentially derivative in nature
have occasionally been allowed, despite the lack of the clear legal basis
generally required by Chinese courts. Whether the losses inflicted by
unpredictability in corporate law are outweighed by the gains of
management accountability is not clear. But the uncertainty surrounding
derivative suits has been greatly reduced by recent amendments to the
Company Law specifically allowing them in certain circumstances.
Allowing such suits to proceed in one statutorily defined channel may have
the effect of stopping up other less well-defined channels, thereby
increasing predictability.
a. Doctrinal Bases
Derivative suits need a special doctrinal basis because the chairman of
the board of a company (or its executive director in the case of a company
223 id
224 See Clarke, supra note 211 (discussing difficulties in enforcing judgments in China).
But see Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgment in the Pearl River Delta of China, 57 AM.
J. COMP. L. 419, 419 (2009) (finding that, at least in the Pearl River Delta, "the enforcement
outcomes are reasonable, the enforcement process is relatively efficient, the problem of local
protectionism is not serious, and the plaintiffs' impressions of the courts have also been quite
positive").
225 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.1 (1986). For a skeptical view, see
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 55, 84 (1991) (concluding that shareholder litigation, including derivative litigation, "is
a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance").
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with no board of directors) occupies a special position in Chinese corporate
law as essentially the personification of the company: the "legal
representative" (fading daibiao ren).2 26 As such, he is more than a mere
agent of the company and cannot be stripped, by board action or otherwise,
of his ability to act in its name. His signature is both necessary and
227
sufficient for the company to act as a plaintiff in litigation.
Consequently, if his interests will be hurt by the lawsuit-most obviously,
if he is a defendant-he will not agree and it cannot, barring some
exception to the normal rule, proceed.
i. 1993 Company Law
China's first Company Law, adopted in 1993, is generally considered
not to have provided for derivative suits.228 The most promising section,
Article 111, reads in its entirety as follows:
If the resolutions of a shareholders' meeting or board of directors
violate laws or administrative regulations and [thereby] infringe the
legitimate rights and interests of shareholders, the shareholders shall
have the right to institute proceedings with a people's court
requesting the cessation of such illegal activities and acts of
infringement. 229
Some commentators have read this as providing the grounds for a
derivative action,230 while others disagree.23 1 From both a textual and a
226 For an excellent discussion of the special position of the legal representative, see Fang
Liufang, Guoqi fading daibiaoren de fahi diwei, quanli he liyi chongtu [The Position,
Powers, and Conflicts ofInterest ofthe Legal Representative in State Enterprises], BIJIAO FA
YANJIU [RESEARCH IN COMP. LAW], No. 4, 1999 (P.R.C), available at
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=9199.
227 See Minshi susong fa [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 49 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
Civil Procedure Law]; Guanyu renmin fayuan shouli jingji jiufen anjian zhong jige wenti de
fuhan [Reply Letter Concerning Some Issues in the Acceptance by People's Courts of
Economic Dispute Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 14, 1990), para. 1
(directing courts to send back for supplementation any complaint not bearing the signature of
an enterprise's legal representative). Prof. Fang Liufang writes:
If the legal representative won't go along, the legal person [i.e., the company] has
no way to initiate or participate in litigation; if the legal representative on his own
initiative takes part in litigation, there are no grounds for preventing him from
exercising the right to sue on behalf of the company.
Fang Liufang, supra note 226.
228 See Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit
System in China, 46 HARv. INT'L L.J. 347, 356-68 (2005).
229 1993 Company Law, supra note 35, art. I11.
230 See, e.g., KONG XIANGJUN, MIN SHANG FA REDIAN NANDIAN J1 QIANYAN WENTI [HOT,
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practical standpoint, the skeptics seem to have the stronger argument; the
differences between an Article 111 lawsuit and a true derivative suit are
clear. First and most obviously, under Article 111 shareholders sue in their
own name, not in the name of the company. Second, only a right to require
cessation of the infringing act is clearly stated; a right to recover damages is
not.232 Third, the only acts that may be complained of are unlawful
resolutions by the shareholders or the board of directors. This excludes not
only lawful resolutions that may nevertheless in some way cause actionable
damage to the shareholders, but also a vast universe of acts and omissions
that do not take the form of resolutions, including all failures to act as well
as actions taken by corporate officers and others without a board or
shareholders' resolution.
Other sections of the 1993 Company Law spell out statutory duties of
officers and directors to the company, 33 and Article 63 states that directors,
supervisors, and managers234 shall be liable for damages caused to the
company by their violation of law, administrative regulations, or the
company's articles of association. But it fails to state that shareholders may
enforce this liability on the company's behalf if the company fails to do so.
More pertinently, courts entertaining derivative suits in China have not
generally found a basis for them in Article 63.
ii. 1999 Securities Law
231China's first Securities Law, issued and effective in 1999 (since
replaced by a substantially amended version effective from Jan. 1, 2006236),
has been thought by some to support derivative litigation, but again the
claim is weak, especially in view of the failure of courts to support it.
Article 42 provides that gains from short-swing (i.e., within a six-month
period) trading by a 5% shareholder shall belong to the company and shall
be recovered in an action initiated by the board of directors.23 7 It further
states that shareholders may request the board to take action if it fails to do
so, and that directors responsible for a failure to take action shall be liable
DIFFICULT, AND CUTTING-EDGE ISSUES IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW] 248 (Renmin
Fayuan Chubanshe 1996) (P.R.C.), cited in Deng, supra note 228, at 356 (view of senior
judge at Supreme People's Court).
231 See, e.g., Deng, supra note 228, at 356-58, and sources cited therein.
232 This point is made by Professor Gu Gongyun in Gu Gongyun, Gongsifa xiuding de
ruogan jianyi [Several Suggestions Regarding the Amendment of the Company Law],
SHANGSHI GONGSI [LISTED COMPANY], No. 5, 2000 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper87/703/84318.html.
233 See, for example, Articles 59 to 62 of the 1993 Company Law, supra note 35.
234 The term "manager" (fingli) here probably means chief executive officer. Chinese
does not distinguish between singulars and plurals.
235 1999 Securities Law, supra note 133.
236 2005 Securities Law, supra note 133.
237 Id., art. 42.
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for losses thereby caused to the company.238 Once again, however, it fails
to spell out that shareholders may step into the shoes of a recalcitrant board
and sue in the name of the company.
iii. Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
In January 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued
its Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
("Principles").23 9 Article 4 of the Principles states that in certain cases of
management wrongdoing, "[s]hareholders have the right to request
(yaoqiu) 240 that the company bring litigation according to law requesting
(yaoqiu) compensation.
Although some commentators have stated that the Principles provide a
legal basis for derivative suits, 242 their argument seems weak. The sentence
in question contains no hint of what is to happen if the company rejects the
shareholder's request to bring litigation. As Chinese courts are as likely as
not to interpret their jurisdiction narrowly in order to avoid nettlesome
cases, this lacuna is significant.
More importantly, however, the Principles simply are not law. They
are a set of standards that the CSRC desires listed companies to implement
in their articles of association. Whether the CSRC has the authority to force
companies to do so is debated; the fact that it wishes companies to do so,
however, suggests that stating the norms in the Principles is not sufficient
to make them operational.
iv. 2004 Beijing Higher People's Court Opinion243
In February 2004, the Beijing Higher Court issued its Guidance
Opinion on Several Issues Relating to the Adjudication of Corporate
Dispute Cases,24 which like the draft of Supreme People's Court Provisions
238 Id.
239 Principles, supra note 162.
240 The term used here, yaoqiu, can mean request or demand (i.e., a request coupled with
a right to compliance). Given other examples of the term in Chinese legislation, I believe
that here it means merely "request" without an associated right to satisfaction.
241 Principles, supra note 162, art. 4.
242 See, e.g., Xuan Weihua & Li Chen, Shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze ruogan wenti pingxi
[Comments on Several Issues Relating to the Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed
Corporations], SHANGSHI GONGSI [LISTED COMPANY], No. 7, 2002 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper87/7526/
7 2 1417.html.
243 Chinese courts and other government agencies frequently issue documents labeled
yyian; although this term is customarily translated "opinion," it means something like a
suggestion, and should not be confused with "opinion" meaning a formal decision issued by
a judge to decide a case.
244 Guanyu shenli gongsi jiufen anjian ruogan wenti de zhidao yijian [Guidance Opinion
on Several Issues Relating to the Adjudication of Corporate Dispute Cases] (promulgated by
the Beijing Higher People's Court, Feb. 9, 2004, effective Feb. 24, 2006) (P.R.C.).
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deals with derivative suits, but which unlike them purports to be effective
upon issuance. Article 8 of the Guidance Opinion, in question-and-answer
format, states in its entirety:
How should the parties be ascertained when a shareholder brings
suit on the grounds that the company's interests have been harmed
by the improper behavior of a shareholder or company management
personnel? This type of litigation is the kind where a shareholder
represents the company's interests in bringing suit; the company
shareholder may be the plaintiff, while the defendants are the
shareholder or company management personnel who engaged in the
improper acts and the opposite party in related transactions. The
245company should participate in the litigation as a third party.
As the document is called a "Guidance Opinion," it is not clear how
far the Beijing Higher People's Court (the highest court in Beijing, which
has the administrative status of a province) wishes to bind the courts under
it. I believe courts would have remained free to reject such suits had they
wished to do so, thus making derivative claims essentially discretionary. At
the same time, however, the Guidance Opinion represents the first
unambiguous declaration from a legally authoritative body that derivative
suits can, at least in some circumstances, be accepted by courts.
v. Supreme People's Court Policy
Finally, it is worth mentioning an informal signal from the Supreme
People's Court. In December 2002, a senior Supreme People's Court judge
stated that courts should accept derivative suits. 246 These remarks were
cited hopefully by one plaintiff; his suit was nevertheless rejected by a
lower court, which informed him that such remarks were "for reference"
only and could not constitute a basis for accepting the suit.247
b. Cases
Despite their unpromising doctrinal foundation, derivative suits are not
245 Id., art. 8.
246 See Gao fayuan fuyuanzhang Li Guoguang biaoshi: Xiao gudong gao da gudong
fayuan ying shouli [Supreme People's Court Vice President Li Guoguang Indicates that
Courts Should Accept Suits by Small Shareholders Against Large Shareholders], BEIJING
YULE XINBAO [BEIJING RECREATION NEWS], Dec. 12, 2002 (P.R.C.), available at
http://news.sohu.com/58/64/news204906458.shtml.
247 See Shouli gudong daibiao susong wei bei shouli [First Shareholder Representative
Suit is not Accepted], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS], Apr. 22, 2003
(P.R.C.), available at http://101.stock888.net/030422/100,101,78015,00.shtml [hereinafter
First Shareholder Suit]; see also Qian Weiqing, Gongsi susong: Gongsi sifajiujifangshi xin
lun (6) [Corporate Litigation: A New Discussion of Methods of Judicial Remedies for
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unknown in China. In the following cases, courts considered and
occasionally accepted arguments that the shareholder plaintiff should be
able, against the wishes of another shareholder that controlled the
company's ability to litigate, to sue another party (sometimes that
shareholder) for damages inflicted directly on the company. Interestingly,
where the courts accepted the argument, they did not attempt to impose any
limiting principle on such arguments; all they seem to have required was a
plausible allegation of damage to the company and a refusal by the
controlling party to seek recovery of those damages.248
i. Zhangjiagang Fiber Company Case
The first generally known case of the post-Mao era was a 1993 suit
brought in Jiangsu Province by the Zhangjiagang Polyester Fiber Factory
("Factory"). 249  The Factory had joined together with a Hong Kong
company, Jixiong Corporation ("Jixiong") to form a Chinese-foreign equity
joint venture called Zhangjiagang Jixiong Chemical Fiber Company ("JV")
in which Jixiong was the controlling party. JV had then entered into a
contract with another Hong Kong company, Daxing Engineering Company
("Daxing"), in which Jixiong had an interest of an unspecified nature.
When a contract dispute arose, Jixiong refused to cause JV to bring suit
against Daxing. Factory then brought suit in a local court in Jiangsu
Province seeking to bring suit on behalf of JV.
The question of Factory's standing ultimately went to the Supreme
People's Court, which responded that although Factory could indeed
exercise the litigation rights of JV, in this particular case it would not be
able to do so because of a pre-existing arbitration agreement.250 Thus, the
case did not actually result in a derivative suit being heard, even though its
acceptability in at least some cases was established in principle. How far
the reasoning of the Court's reply reaches has never been clear; given how
248 Another quasi-derivative suit case not discussed here for reasons of space is the
Taishan Company case. For an interesting discussion of the case, see Zhang Rulian & Wang
Ling, Ben an gudong shifou you quan chongdang yuangao daibiao gongsi tiqi susong [Does
the Shareholder in This Case Have the Right to Take the Role of Plaintiff and Bring Suit on
Behalf of the Company?], RENMIN FAYUAN WANG [PEOPLE'S CT. NET], May 31, 2004,
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=l 17915 (P.R.C.).
249 The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 228, at 365 n.108. See also
Guanyu zhongwai hezi jingying qiye duiwai fasheng jingji hetong jiufen, kongzhi heying
qiye de waifang yu maifang you lihai guanxi, heying qiye de zhongfang ying yi shei de
mingyi xiang renmin fayuan qisu wenti de fuhan [Reply Letter on the Issue of in Whose
Name the Chinese Party in a Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Should Bring Suit When
the Joint Venture Has an Economic Contract Dispute with an External Party and the Foreign
Party Controlling the Joint Venture Has a Relationship of Interest with the Seller]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 4, 1994) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-4-01.html [hereinafter SPC
Reply on Derivative Suits].
250 id.
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the Court chose to entitle it, it could be read as applying narrowly to
Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures controlled by a foreign party.
Although it seems to have been cited in a subsequent purely domestic
case,25 in general, courts have been far from interpreting it as an
encouragement, let alone a command, to accept derivative suits.
ii. Shanghai Yanzhong Water Company Cases
In 1996 and 1997, a widely publicized and complex series of lawsuits
involving the Yanzhong Drinking Water Company tested the appetite of the
Shanghai courts for derivative suits.252 Ultimately, the plaintiffs attempt to
bring such a suit was rejected.
The Yanzhong cases pitted a minority (30%) shareholder
("Yanzhong"), which controlled the chairman of the board, against the
majority (60%) shareholder ("Zhongtian"), which had a majority of board
seats and controlled the general manager (i.e., the CEO). Both attempted to
cause the company to bring a lawsuit that they would control to their own
advantage; both lawsuits were dismissed. A lawsuit by Zhongtian in its
own name against Yanzhong for damages caused to the company brought a
doctrinally unsatisfactory result: while acknowledging the applicability of
the Supreme People's Court's Reply in the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company
Case, the court allowed the majority shareholder both to sue and to recover
in its own name in the approved settlement; another minority (10%)
shareholder received nothing.
iii. Xiamen Xinda Network Company Case
In May 1997, the Xiamen Xinda Network Company ("Network") was
formed by three Chinese investors: Xiamen Xinda Company ("Xinda"),
Century Manpower Company ("Century I") and Century Communications
Company ("Century II") (essentially the same party), and Hualun Company
("Hualun"). 5 3 Century I and Century II collectively had the power to
appoint two directors; Xinda could appoint two, and Hualun could appoint
one. After Century I and Century II refused to repay a loan from Network,
the three non-Xinda directors rejected Xinda's call for a meeting of the
board of directors to authorize action in pursuit of the debt. Xinda then
brought suit, naming as defendants Century I and Century II as well as
251 See the Wu Fang Zhai case, discussed in infra Part IV.F.iv.
252 The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 228, at 366-67; it is discussed
in numerous Chinese sources, including Fang Liufang, supra note 226.
253 The facts of this case are taken from Xie Zhihong & Chen Mingtian, Gudong
paisheng susong zai sikao [Rethinking Shareholder Derivative Suits], FUJIAN ZHENG-FA
GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL J. OF THE FUJIAN POLITICAL-LEGAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CADRE INSTITUTE], No. 4, 2001, at 24, 24 (P.R.C.). One of the authors is
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Network.
Unlike many other cases, this case presents a clear victory for a
derivative suit theory. Not only did the plaintiff win in the first instance,
but the victory was upheld on appeal with a specific reference to that
theory:
If the infringement suffered by the shareholder is to the rights of the
company, then the shareholder should first present a written
application to the organ of power of the company requesting that the
company take action or bring litigation against the party inflicting
the harm and pursue its legal liability. Where the company does not
take any action, the shareholder may instead bring a lawsuit.254
iv. Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai Company Case
In December 2000, Zhu Chuanlin entered into an agreement with the
Jiaxing Commercial Holding Company ("Holding") to purchase its 50%
holding in the Wu Fang Zhai Company ("Wu Fang Zhai"), a joint stock
25company.25 He later brought suit against Zhao Jianping, the chairman of
Wu Fang Zhai, alleging that Zhao had caused Wu Fang Zhai to guarantee
the debt of a stockholder in violation of Article 147 of the Company Law,
and that Wu Fang Zhai had been forced to pay the debt-2.6 million
yuan-after the stockholder defaulted.
Ruling in Zhu's favor, the court found that although the Company Law
at that time had no specific provisions allowing for shareholder derivative
suits, "the principle is clear" from viewing Articles 63 and 111 together.
Moreover, it found that the 1994 Supreme People's Court Reply in the
256 257
Zhangjiagang Fiber Company case constituted a precedent.
v. San Jiu Pharmaceutical Company Case
Not all attempts at derivative suits were successful. In April 2003, a
shareholder of Shanghai-based San Jiu Pharmaceutical Company brought
254 Id. (summarizing court's reasoning).
255 The facts of this case are taken from LUo PEIXIN, GONGSI FA DE HETONG JIESHI [A
CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION OF COMPANY LAW] 335-36 (2004). Further detail can be
found at Lu Xiaoping, Dongshizhang zi tao yaobao pei 250 wan; Zhiyi Wu Fang Zhai shilian
[Chairman of the Board Compensates 2.5 Million From His Own Wallet; Questions About
the Wu Fang Zhai Case], CAIJING SHIBAO [FIN. & ECON. TIMEs], July 27, 2001(P.R.C.),
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/200 1072 7/88
091.html; Dou shi danbao re de huo;
Dongshizhang bei gudong gaodao [A Disaster All Caused by a Guarantee; Chairman of the
Board Brought Down by Shareholder Suit], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], July
27, 2001 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.chinalawinfo.com/fldt/xwnr.asp?id=2185.
256 SPC Reply on Derivative Suits, supra note 249.
257 The direct and indirect quotations from the court's decision come from Luo PEIXIN,
supra note 255, at 335. I have been unable to find a copy of the court's judgment.
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suit in Shenzhen's Futian Basic-Level People's Court against Zhao
Xinxian, a director of the company, for damages he had inflicted on the
company through related-party transactions and through disclosure failures
that had resulted in fines to the company of 500,000 yuan.2 58  After the
court rejected his suit, the shareholder refiled in the same month in the
name of the company in Shenzhen's Intermediate People's Court. That
court, however, refused to hear his suit on the grounds that the right to sue
in the company's name required the agreement-apparently unanimous-of
all the shareholders.259 Even requiring the consent of the majority-
precisely those who had been involved in the misappropriation-would
have made further prosecution of the suit impossible. Still less could
unanimous consent be achieved.
c. Derivative Suits in the New Company Law
The new Company Law, 2 6 0 adopted in October 2005 and effective as
of January 1, 2006, finally provides a sound statutory basis for derivative
suits, albeit with certain limitations. According to Article 152, shareholders
holding 1% singly or collectively may, depending on the circumstances,
make a demand on the board of directors or the board of supervisors to sue
under Article 150 of the Company Law, which imposes liability for
compensation on any director, supervisor, or senior manager who causes
losses to the company by violating "laws, administrative regulations, or the
articles of association during the course of performing his duties[.]" If the
company does not bring suit within 30 days, the shareholders may bring suit
in their own name.
It is too early to know how Article 152 will be implemented in
practice. As it offers very little by way of procedural guidance, a court not
disposed to hear such cases will find a ready justification for inaction. Like
the case law and quasi-legislative material preceding it, however, Article
152 appears to allow suits automatically provided only that shareholders
258 Zhao had already been fined 100,000 yuan by the CSRC in related proceedings for
various transgressions. The facts of this case are taken from Deng, supra note 228, at 371;
Wu Hanqing, Gudong daibiao susong de zai sikao [Rethinking the Shareholder
Representative Suit], GUANGDONG CAIJING ZHIYE XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. GUANGDONG
VOCATIONAL ACAD. OF FIN. & ECON.], Vol. 2, No. 6, Dec. 2003, at 83, 83-86; and
Xingzheng chufa jueding Shu (San Jiu yi yao ji xiangguan renyuan) [Administrative
Punishment Decision (San Jiu Pharmaceutical and Related Persons)] (promulgated by the
CSRC, July 4, 2002) 2002 Zheng Jian Fa Zi. For more detail on the specific acts, see
Gongmeng Chen et al., Is China's Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger?
Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 451, 481-82 (2005).
259 In order to avoid a formal decision that could be appealed, the court notified the
plaintiff's lawyer solely through a telephone call. See First Shareholder Suit, supra note
247. This procedure makes plausible the suspicion that the decision may have had less to do
with the merits than with the local political clout of the company's management.
260 2005 Company Law, supra note 35.
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satisfy certain procedural requirements. There is no apparent room for
courts to consider an argument that bringing suit would not be in the
interests of the company.
Even though derivative suits are now formally allowed, economic
obstacles remain. When the recovery is to the company, the minority
shareholder-who will benefit from the recovery only in proportion to his
shareholding-has little incentive to bring suit unless he can recover his
costs off the top. While Chinese law generally awards trial costs to the
winner, such costs are usually defined only as funds paid to the court as
filing and other fees, and do not include attorneys' fees.
Other commentators support establishing a foundation that would own
shares in every listed company.26 2 Corporate governance litigation through
similar non-profit organizations has proved reasonably successful in South
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan;263 whether the model can be transplanted to a
country in which the government keeps tight control over civil society
institutions remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the institutional environment in China for
corporate governance institutions understood in a narrow sense: those that
operate to mitigate both vertical and horizontal agency costs and attempt to
align the interests of those who manage money with those who supply it.
This Article has lessons for existing literature in the field of comparative
corporate governance and, in turn, takes from lessons from it.
First, this Article bears on the LLSV literature that attempts to measure
legal institutions through law on the books, typically as embodied in
statutes. Although criticism of this literature for ignoring the law as it
actually functions is not new, one contribution of this Article is to show
specifically and in detail just how far and why, in one important
jurisdiction, law on the books turns out to be very hard to measure-which
"books," for example, does one actually observe?-and to diverge
considerably from practice. This is not to say that the task of measuring
legal inputs and outputs is entirely hopeless and cannot possibly yield valid
results, but it is to suggest that the measurement is extremely difficult, and
261 See Wu Yanfen, Lun woguo minshi susongfeiyong zhidu de gaige yu wanshan [On
the Reform and Perfection of the System of Civil Litigation Costs in China], GUANGXI
XINGZHENG GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. GUANGXI ADMIN. MGMT. CADRE C.], No. 5,
2004, at 82, 84 (P.R.C.).
262 See, e.g., Liang Dingbang (Anthony Neoh), Cong zhengquan jianguan jiaodu kan
gongsi fa xiugai [ Viewing the Amendment of the Company Law from the Angle of Securities
Supervision], in GONGSI FA XIUGAI ZONGHENG TAN [AN ALL-AROUND DISCussIoN OF
REFORM OF THE COMPANY LAW], supra note 107, at 29, 32-33 (P.R.C.).
263 See generally Curtis Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection:
Economic Theory, and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169 (2004).
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must be done with far more sensitivity to local conditions than has been
apparent so far. That this will no doubt be costly and make it hard to
accumulate data for dozens of countries is unfortunate, but it is not less true
for being unfortunate.
Second, it bears on, and takes lessons from, the literature on
comparative institutional choice. Pistor and Xu argue that administrative
agencies are in principle suited to certain legal tasks, whereas other tasks
264are in principle best left to courts. In their model, administrative agencies
engage in ex ante, comprehensive rule-making and rule enforcement,
whereas courts engage in ex post dispute settlement. They argue that the
criteria for selecting institutions (as between administrative agencies and
courts) should be the degree to which the law needs further elucidation and
interpretation (which they call incompleteness), the ability to standardize
potentially harmful or beneficial actions such that an administrative agency
could engage in ex ante enforcement, and the level of expected harm if a
violation is not prevented (by ex ante action) or deterred (by the prospect of
ex post action). They conclude that fiduciary duty obligations in particular
are best assigned to courts for enforcement, since these duties cannot be
standardized and yet at the same time have a low potential for severe harm,
since they are by their nature limited to one company.265
As Pistor and Xu acknowledge, however, allocating certain tasks to
courts as called for by their model may be pointless if courts are ineffective
because of corruption, lack of political power, or other reasons, and thus
extensive institutional reform may first be required.266 This caveat certainly
seems to apply to China. To the extent the policy advice presupposes
extensive institutional reform, however, it loses its value as advice about
incremental policy changes that can be undertaken now on a platform of
existing institutions.
Thus, for all the attention it receives, the shareholder rights approach
described in Part II-indeed, any approach that relies upon formal legal
institutions--cannot be expected to form the mainstay of an effective
corporate governance regime. The courts have neither the power nor the
inclination to play a major role, and government agencies such as the CSRC
do not have the resources to serve as a substitute.
Nor does the ownership approach hold out much hope. At present,
dominant shareholders seem either to abuse their control or to fail to
exercise it entirely. There are two possible ways in which these problems
could be remedied. The state could improve its internal management
system so that it becomes a more effective monitor in the companies it
dominates. Such a reform is imaginable, but fails to address the issue of
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abuse of control. The control of abuses rests ultimately, like the
shareholder rights approach, on legal institutions-and as argued above,
legal institutions are weak reeds on which to rely.
Unfortunately, the best available substitute approach, that of market
monitoring, is disfavored by the state. The Chinese state prefers direct
regulation by government agencies first, and indirect regulation by private
litigation in the courts next. Regulation by the uncontrolled institutions of
the market comes a distant third, and indeed it is hard to find such
institutions in China. The stock markets are creatures of the state and exist
only upon its sufferance; securities firms are established and owned by
various governmental bodies; banks are either directly owned or highly
controlled by governmental bodies; finally, the financial press is subject to
significant state influence, both through ownership channels and through
the state's pervasive regulation of the media.
In a state with limited administrative resources, it would make sense to
rely as much as possible on the contributions of non-state actors. Yet
Chinese corporate governance institutions are tilted toward the legal
because the government generally suspects market and civil society
institutions. It wants rules, not incentive structures. There is a strong
emphasis on getting the rules right, and an inadequate attention to
institutions that could be flexible in creating and enforcing rules as the
situation warranted.26 7
Troy Paredes has cogently argued that market solutions to corporate
governance problems are inappropriate for developing countries, because
they do not have the necessary second-order institutions-lawyers,
accountants, investment bankers, securities analysts, etc.-that are needed
for markets to function successfully. 268 Private ordering cannot be relied on
because parties simply do not have the training and experience to bargain
toward efficient arrangements. Therefore, corporate law should consist
largely of mandatory, bright-line rules that are easily monitored and
enforced, not vague standards and default rules.269
What an examination of Chinese institutions shows, however, is the
need for a comparative institutional analysis of the type urged by Neil
Komesar.270 To be sure, civil society institutions of the type that would
promote market ordering in China are indeed weak. But it does not follow
267 In the words of Ronald Gilson, "the goal is not necessarily to seek the optimal
governance institutions for existing industrial conditions. Rather, reform of national
governance systems should strive to assure that institutional structure facilitates prompt and
low-cost organizational responses to changes in industrial technology." Ronald J. Gilson,
Path Dependence and Comparative Corporate Governance: Corporate Governance and
Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 341 (1996).
268 See Paredes, supra note 21.
269 See id.
270 See generally KOMESAR, supra note 6.
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that institutions for state ordering can do the job any better. The key issue
is that of which types of institutional reforms would yield the most bang for
the buck. The policy option of simply allowing civil society institutions to
do more is often overlooked in studies of corporate governance in other
jurisdictions for the simple reason that few other jurisdictions impose such
strict controls. But in the case of China, this area offers a great deal of
room for reform.
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